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When warlords use violence to coerce democratically constituted
governments to share power, does power-sharing simply become a
euphemism for "guns for jobs"?
Which legal rules, if any, govern peace agreements in internal con-
flicts?' Specifically, which rules regulate power-sharing? Are the aims of
peace, justice, and adherence to the rule of law attainable, let alone com-
patible, with coerced political transitions where warlords force
democratically constituted or legitimate governments to share power?
2
Consider this scenario: a rebel group, through brutal force, coerces a
democratically elected government into a power-sharing arrangement
that not only refashions the constitution of order but confers on the re-
bels unconditional amnesty, key government positions, and other
privileges. Although the incumbent government prefers to punish the
rebels rather than negotiate with them, it shares power out of political
necessity and expediency because it lacks the muscle to defeat the rebels
on the battlefield and the status or legitimacy to mobilize international
military assistance to impose its political prerogatives. The failure to ne-
gotiate a cessation of hostilities inevitably results in prolonged conflict,
1. The terms rule, rules, law, and laws are used interchangeably.
2. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is not binding on the ac-
cords; the definition of coercion in the VCLT, however, is instructive, given that there is not a
generally recognized definition of the term in Liberian and Sierra Leone law nor the laws that
govern internal conflicts. According to the VCLT, coerced is derived from the word coercion,
defined as the threat or use of force or other pressure to gain control over another against his
will or interest. Under the VCLT, treaties may be voided if their acceptance was gained by
coercion against the state that wished to void the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 22, 1969, arts. 51-52, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT]. Although treaties cannot, per se, be
concluded with rebel groups, the governing principles of those arrangements inform the fol-




anarchy, and the eventual toppling of the government. Variations on this
scenario have been commonplace in Africa for decades.3
A government that has been violently and successfully challenged
from within, but is still recognized as the de jure representative of the
state, is faced with the quandary of how best to negotiate peace, main-
tain security, survive politically, and manage future uncertainties.5 It is
forced to make strategic choices that often create normative friction be-
tween what is legal on one hand and what is politically necessary and
expedient on the other. To date, political scientists, who tend to be pro-
ponents of power-sharing and seem to ignore the rule and role of law in
political transitions, have controlled the debate over the legitimacy of
power-sharing, which unfortunately has slipped under the radar of inter-
national lawyers. For example, in her seminal work on the stability of
negotiated settlements to intrastate wars, Caroline Hartzell includes three
subsections on the "rules regarding the use of coercive force," "rules re-
garding the distribution of political power," and "rules structuring
distributive policy" but makes no attempt to consider the extent to which
rules govern peace agreements, if at all.6 Timothy Sisk's influential work
on power-sharing and international mediation also fails to consider the
rule and/or role of law in peace negotiations or peace deals that include
power-sharing components.7 This Article was inspired by the apparent
disregard for the sanctity of the rule of law in the literature on power-
sharing and among decisionmakers, who seem to discount its relevance
all together-especially those responsible for negotiating the Accra and
Lom6 accords,8  which arguably prescribed illegal power-sharing
3. See generally Peter Wallensteen & Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflicts, Conflict
Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996, 34 J. PEACE RES. 339, 350-53 (1997).
4. The internal challenge may come in the form of, among other things, an armed
insurgency that acquires de facto control of the state but stops short of a coup d'dtat or one
that mounts a successful coup d'dtat.
5. This assertion does not take for granted the fact that governments and rebels are
often not interested in making peace but politically and economically thrive off of state chaos
and violent conflict. See generally GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL
WARS (Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000).
6. Caroline Hartzell, Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate
Wars, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 7-12 (1999).
7. See generally TIMOTHY D. SISK, POWERSHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
IN ETHINIC CONFLICTS (1996).
8. The Accra and Lom6 accords are domestic (between actors within a state) rather
than international treaties because under the VCLT "a 'treaty' means an international agree-
ment concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its par-
ticular designation." See VCLT, supra note 2, art. 2. Moreover, the accords cannot legally be
considered treaties because they were not registered with the UN Secretariat in accordance
with article 102 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the registration of a treaty or international
agreement
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irrespective of long-term social costs.9 To what extent, if any, does and
should the rule of law influence the character of peace negotiations,
agreements, and political transitions?
This Article represents the first conscientious attempt to address
these questions, present a conceptual framework for examining the legal
and political efficacy of coercing democratically constituted govern-
ments into sharing power, and define a lawful basis or approach to
sharing power when governments are confronted with the aforemen-
tioned scenario.'l The Article is polemical and questions the dominant
logic that political power-sharing is lawful, legitimate, and unequivocally
serves the public good, arguing that power-sharing deals that ignore con-
trolling rules are unlawful and not viable.
This Article examines the legal and political efficacy of power-
sharing in the Accra Agreement (2003) and Lom6 Agreement (1999) in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively." It scrutinizes how little weight
law was given in peace negotiations, examines the law relevant to power-
sharing, and challenges the well-settled practice of sharing power, which
contravenes such law. Power-sharing, as opposed to, for example, am-
nesty, is the subject here. A burgeoning literature addresses the legality
and validity of amnesty in peace agreements when international crimes
have been committed,' 2 but the author is not familiar with a single com-
prehensive work that questions the legal efficacy of power-sharing-
making this Article original in concept and scope. This is a critically im-
does not imply a judgment by the Secretariat on the nature of the instrument, the
status of a party or any similar question. It is the understanding of the Secretariat
that its action does not confer on the instrument the status of a treaty or an interna-
tional agreement if it does not already have that status and does not confer on a
party a status which it would not otherwise have.
Id.
9. Other important examples of power-sharing in need of constructive analysis in-
clude, among others, Angola, C6te d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Fiji, Colombia, Rwanda, Somalia, and
Sudan.
10. Given the proliferation of internal challenges to democratically constituted author-
ity in Africa, this Article is limited to the study of power-sharing between democratically
constituted regimes and the warlords and rebel groups that seek to unseat them violently. It
does not consider the legality of power-sharing between undemocratically constituted regimes
and rebels because the arguably normative status of the right to democracy, particularly in
Africa, engenders different legal questions-especially as they relate to self-determination as a
jus cogens norm.
11. The discussion will center on states emerging from civil conflict and focus on the
issue of power-sharing between democratically constituted governments and warlords and
rebels who have committed or participated in the commission of international crimes. See
infra Part III for background information about the circumstances and histories that led to
these accords.
12. See infra note 38. See generally Sarah Williams, Amnesties in International Law:
The Experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 271 (2005).
[Vol. 27:495
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portant contribution given that power-sharing is more expansive and has
a greater impact on sustainable peace than amnesty, which is conceptu-
ally and practically more narrow and, typically, a lesser but necessary
element of power-sharing. In other words, amnesty may be given with-
out sharing power, but power-sharing without amnesty is atypical.'3
Amnesty applies to certain individuals and/or groups, whereas power-
sharing directly affects a state's entire population, as it reconstructs or
reorders the framework of governance and its future disposition.
Power-sharing arrangements are typically long term and systemic, as
they determine who will have a seat at the table of power, in what capac-
ity, and for how long. While amnesties are permanent, they are
nonetheless specific to the individual; again, in contrast, power-sharing
directly affects the entire population of a state, including those who re-
ceive amnesty. A rebel awarded amnesty can leave the state immediately
(e.g., the speedy departure of Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, Sierra Leone's
notorious senior Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel commander,
from Sierra Leone to Liberia after the institution of the Lom6 Agree-
ment);14 power-sharing, however, is long term and systematic. It
establishes the foundation and framework for governance and forces war
victims to live under the rule of alleged war criminals and other abusers.
This type of peace raises vital questions about the governance and de-
velopmental challenges faced by war-torn states. The logic behind
power-sharing assumes that rebels and warlords will behave and act as
good citizens once they are given authoritative positions. It presupposes
that warlords can become democrats once sanctioned with state author-
ity. Power-sharing with warlords and rebels also sets a negative
precedent, as it sends a dangerous message to would-be insurrectionists
that violence is a legitimate means to effectuate change and obtain po-
litical power. For these reasons, the subject of power-sharing deserves
distinct analysis, separate and apart from amnesty-particularly concern-
ing its impact on the rule of law in post conflict societies.
This Article argues that when democratically constituted regimes are
forced to choose between negotiating peace and being violently dis-
lodged from power, peace agreements based on the rule of law should
prevail over extralegal arrangements born out of political necessity and
expediency. This is so because "legal peace" has less adverse impacts on
the political order and is more viable and sustainable over the long term
13. This assertion concerns amnesty under local or domestic law, not international law.
14. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Si-
erra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, Dec. 6-19, 1999, at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/
rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/998064e 19e72c I f6852568860055ced5 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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than "illegal peace."'5 Those deciding to share power should consider not
simply political variables but also legal ones, as the law has an important
regulatory role to play: it must constrain the political aspirations of deci-
sionmakers and ensure the lawfulness of peace deals. The point is that
the rules governing the legality of peace agreements must be adhered to,
particularly when the beneficiaries of power-sharing acquired power un-
democratically and unlawfully and are likely responsible for committing
human atrocities. As Steven Ratner has aptly noted, atrocities are "those
violations of human rights and humanitarian law involving severe assault
on the human person, both corporeal and spiritual-what Agnes Heller
has called 'genuinely heinous crimes' that are 'manifestations of evil.' ,,16
It follows that those who are responsible for committing atrocities and
crimes against the state should be barred from "public service."
The logic underpinning this position raises several difficult questions
for governments under siege: Who is responsible for internal disorder,
repression, and post-conflict justice? Is it immoral for a government to
allow deadly conflict to continue until "legal peace" is reached? This
position also raises several questions about when, if ever, leaders should
accept "illegal peace": Should individual responsibility for repression be
excused for the perceived collective good? Should power-sharing and
amnesty take precedence over retributive justice? Should the political
prerogatives of warlords and rebels supersede the fundamental civil, po-
litical, and human rights of their victims?
7
15. A "legal peace" is one that is derived in accordance with or sanctioned by lawful
law (e.g. democratic constitution), whereas "illegal peace" is forged through the application of
unlawful rules over lawful ones. This characterization is taken from the definition of "illegal"
in A DIcTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 275 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1987).
16. Steven Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law,
87 GEO. L.J. 712 (1999). This inquiry is limited to the study of the legality of power-sharing
under human rights law and democracy norms and leaves for further investigation the extent to
which international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and refugee law can inform
the study of the lawfulness of power-sharing.
17. For purposes of this Article, the term rebels means irregular persons or military
forces operating irregularly who take part in armed rebellion (e.g., insurgency) against a con-
stituted authority (i.e., a government). Here, the term warlord
refers to the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand
fighters, who can hold territory locally and, at the same time, act financially and po-
litically in the international system without interference from the state in which he
is based. In crisis zones around the world, where civil war and humanitarian disas-
ters accompany the struggles of societies in transition, the warlord is the key actor.
He confronts national governments, plunders their resources, moves and extermi-
nates uncooperative populations, interdicts international relief and development,
and derails peace processes. With only a few exceptions, the modem warlord lives
successfully beyond the reach and jurisdiction of civil society. His ability to seek
refuge in the crisis zone and the lack of international commitment to take effective
action together ensure his survival.
[Vol. 27:495
There is a tension between peace deals that include power-sharing
on the one hand and the protection of human rights on the other. As
Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson rightly note:
The need to establish power-sharing structures that accommo-
date rival factions and interests may well clash with the need to
root out the perpetrators of human rights abuses. Similarly, the
need to reform state and enemy security institutions may be at
odds with the practical requirement of bringing those groups
who have a monopoly on the instruments of coercion into the
peace process. Without peace there can be no justice. Without
justice, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, the peace it-
self will not last.'
8
Hence, there is no single or simple answer to these questions. Al-
though a negotiated peace may be the only means available to
governments in the scenario presented, particularly when the interna-
tional system of peace and security envisioned in the United Nations
Charter is undermined by UN Security Council inaction, the author is
not familiar with any viable examples where quick-fix approaches to
resolving deep-rooted sociopolitical conflict brought about sustainable
peace. Power-sharing with warlords defeats the logic and objective of
long-term peace by institutionalizing the predatory behavior of warlords
into the body politic, giving them the cloak of state authority to prey on
the state and its citizens-a situation that sows the seeds for future con-
flict, as was the case in Sierra Leone. Extralegal strategies for peace born
out of political necessity and expediency also ignore the traumatic im-
pact of conflict on civil society, particularly women and children,'
9 and
its devilish effect on the organic political order-not to mention the fact
that it is antithetical to the creation of a rule-based political culture.
Post-conflict transitional political arrangements that do not consider
the broader sociopolitical and legal impact of power-sharing and am-
nesty arrangements on civil society, regime transitions, and durable
peace create a type of "weak peace" and are unlikely to succeed.
20 As
John Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, in Building Stability in Africa: Challenges in the New
Millennium (Center for Def. Stud., Monograph No. 46, 2000). For more on this issue, see
Mark Duffield, Dep't Int'l Dev., Post-modem Conflict, Aid Policy and Humanitarian Condi-
tionality 18 (1997).
18. Chester Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson, Making Peace Settlements Work, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Autumn 1996, at 68.
19. See Amnesty International, Stop the Violence Against Women Campaign, at http://
www.amnesty.org/resources/flash/svaw/conflict/eng/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
20. The term weak peace may be defined as peace derived out of political necessity and
expediency, where decisionmakers do not give the social, political, and legal implications of
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Ratner has noted, the "linkage between democracy and accountability is
not merely about a relationship between the past and the future, but one
that immediately implicates the present and the status of the transition."2'
Internal and external actors' patchwork prescriptions for halting Africa's
civil wars-regardless of the long-term social costs-are debatably in-
dicative of the inherent contradiction and geopolitical bias in
international responses to conflict in Africa and the developing world
generally. Since acceptance of "weak peace" is often the only option for
embattled African regimes, the relevance and value of the UN Charter-
based system of peace and security must be called into question.
This Article asks whether any "coerced peace" that empowers and
rewards warlords rather than punishes, sanctions, or in some way holds
them accountable is justified and lawful if it serves the "greater good" of
peace. It has been argued that by failing to hold warlords and rebels ac-
countable, decisionmakers undermine the most important element of any
sustained transition to peace: respect for and adherence to the rule of
law.2 As the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrate, ignoring the
preeminence of the rule of law in transitional peace agreements may set
a dangerous and negative precedent. 23 Transitional political processes
derived from coercion debatably institutionalize unlawful practices into
peace arrangements, along with the skewed notion that might is right in
domestic and international relations. Such arrangements appear to con-
firm the belief of warlords and rebels that they can bully legitimate
governments into lucrative deals with impunity, effectively contracting
away the rights of victims of war by denying them any form of effective
redress. This type of "illegal peace" seems to create a nexus of circular
causation between warlordism and state disorder, with deadly conflict
and injustice as permanent features. Should the wants of warlords take
precedence over the fundamental civil, political, and human rights needs
of their victims for the greater good of peace? If so, does this type of
power-sharing subvert or secure democracy?
an agreement for long-term peace and stability due consideration nor derive legitimacy from
mass consensus or civil society.
21. Ratner, supra note 16, at 719.
22. See generally Diane Orenlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 713 (1997); Robert Quinn, Will
the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. Rav. 905 (1994).
23. Orenlicher, supra note 22.
24. Under international law, democracy may be broadly defined as "the right of all
citizens to participate in the political life of their societies"; the "will of the people is to be the
basis of the authority of government." James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 113-14 (1993).
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This Article, which is divided into six major parts, considers these
questions and issues in detail. The first Part examines the major argu-
ments for and against power-sharing. The second Part briefly discusses
why the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Accra and Lom6
peace accords, respectively, were selected. The third Part details the po-
litical circumstances that led to the Accra and Lom6 peace agreements.
The fourth Part examines the sum and substance of those provisions in
the accords that concern power-sharing. The fifth Part evaluates the le-
gality and political utility of these power-sharing provisions using the de
lege lata under domestic, subregional, regional, and international law.
The sixth Part concludes.
II. THE QUESTION OF POWER-SHARING25
Little scholarly literature discusses the lawfulness of peace agree-
ments, and the author is not familiar with any comprehensive work that
addresses the legality of power-sharing. Significant literature does exist,
however, on the legality of amnesty provisions in peace agreements or,
stated differently, the degree to which international law requires states to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes.26 This Part and those that
follow draw direction and analytic content from this literature. This ap-
proach is an appropriate one because amnesty is a necessary prerequisite
for almost all peace agreements that include power-sharing. Conse-
quently, rationales behind arguments for and against amnesty inform the
question of power-sharing.
The primary question of whether to share power in Africa has thus
far been political, subordinate to the goal of appeasing the prerogatives
of parties at war in order to stop the conflict and reconstitute order and
political authority amid violence and chaos. As previously mentioned,
debates on the utility of power-sharing have to date been dominated by
political scientists, who seem to believe sharing power is a purely
25. The methodological approach in this section was influenced by Diba Majzub,
Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court, 3 MELBOURNE J. INT'L
L. 247 (2002).
26. See generally Roman Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of
Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 297 (2000); John Dugard, Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime: Is Am-
nesty Still an Option? 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1001 (1999); Richard Goldstone, Past Human
Rights Violations: Truth Commissions and Amnesties or Prosecutions, 51 N. IRELAND L.Q.
164 (2000); Neil Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mecha-
nisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1996); Orenlicher,
supra note 22; Ratner, supra note 16; Quinn, supra note 22; Michael Scharf, The Letter of the
Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 41
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41(1996).
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political enterprise." In addition, decisionmakers frequently see peace
negotiations and processes through political rather than legal lenses;
thus, the outcomes of such negotiations are often legally flawed or prob-
lematic. This does not mean the law offers a more viable model for
resolving protracted conflict and refashioning order in conflict-ridden
states; nevertheless, peace agreements guided by legal principles, par-
ticularly those drawing on domestic, regional, and international rules,
seem more sustainable.28 Peace brokers should recognize and give due
consideration to the rule of law, even in lawless societies grossly affected
by warfare. The failure to recognize the important regulatory function of
rules in peace negotiations and settlements has resulted in the emergence
of weak peace arrangements that failed in the short run.29 Hence, again,
the question of whether to share power should be as much a legal ques-
tion as a political one.
A. Arguments for Power-Sharing
On its face, power-sharing is an effective way to give all parties at
conflict, whether rebels, warlords, or government officials, a stake in
27. For example, see generally Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing
Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, 47 AM. J. POL. Scl. 318
(2004); Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie & Donald Rothchild, Stabilizing the Peace After
Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables, 55 INT'L ORG. 183 (2001); Wallensteen &
Sollenberg, supra note 3; Sisk, supra note 7; Barbara Walter, Designing Transitions From
Civil War, 24 INT'L SECURITY 127 (1999).
28. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a small
but prominent subregional organization in West Africa composed of 15 states, levied sanctions
against Togo in order to ensure a return to constitutional rule after what was termed a military
coup, in which the army unlawfully installed Faure Eyad6ma, son of President Gnassingb6
Eyaddma, after his father's death. The Constitution of Togo requires that the Speaker of the
Parliament take over power in the event of the death of the president, not his "eldest heir." In
what has been called Africa's democratic test case, immense pressure to restore the constitu-
tional rule of law and order from ECOWAS and the AU was effective in reversing the coup.
Preventing Constitutional Crisis in ECOWAS After Togo, GHANAIAN CHRON. (Accra), Mar.
15, 2005, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200503150071.html (last visited
Dec. 9, 2005); ECOWAS Press Release, Faure Gnassingbe Steps Down, ECOWAS Lifts Sanc-
tions, Feb. 26, 2005, at http://www.ecowas.int/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2006); Togo's Interim
Leader Steps Down, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4299731.stm (last visited Dec. 9, 2005); Nigeria Holds Firm on Togo "Coup," BBC NEWS,
Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/4267395.stm (last visited
Dec. 9, 2005); Annan Calls on Togolese to Respect Own Constitution in Appointing Presiden-
tial Successor, UN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2005; Coup in Togo After President Dies,
WIKINEWS, Feb. 6, 2005, available at http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Coup-in-Togo-after_
President-dies (last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
29. For example, as the forgoing analysis will demonstrate, the Lom6 Agreement
(1999), which ended eight years of civil war in Sierra Leone, arguably failed because it ig-
nored controlling domestic, subregional, and regional and international rules that prohibited
granting amnesty to and sharing power with warlords and rebels responsible for mass human
atrocities. See infra Part III for more information.
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governance. While social scientists have developed different power-
sharing models and approaches, 0 the underlying goal in all is to give
warring factions political legitimacy and decision-making authority in
government with the hope they will stop fighting and take a vested inter-
est in the vitality of the state. Hartzell asserts that power-sharing
institutions "define how decisions are to be made within a divided soci-
ety and the distribution of decision-making rights within a state [and]
have been a central element of recent peace settlements negotiated in
Bosnia, the Philippines, and Northern Ireland."3' The "more extensive the
power-sharing," some commentators argue, the more likely that peace
will endure, as sharing power promotes "moderate and cooperative be-
havior among contending groups by fostering a positive-sum perception
of political interactions.,32 Advocates of power-sharing contend that by
neutralizing violent conflict and opening the political process (i.e., by
creating a venue for parties at conflict and other societal groups to par-
ticipate in governance), it serves a public good and makes an essential
contribution to any transition to lasting peace.33 It follows that power-
sharing is necessary in states embroiled in war and is often the only way
to forestall conflict, restore the rule of law, strengthen societal support
for government, and create the political space for democratic elections
and transition. As Timothy Sisk notes, the "principal assumption under-
lining power-sharing theory is the belief that appropriate political
30. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST MOD-
ERN EPOCH (Daniel Elazar ed., 1991); Michael Leifer, Power-sharing and Peacemaking in
Cambodia, 12 SAIS REV., Winter/Spring 1992; Arend Lijphart, Power-sharing, Ethnic Agnos-
ticism, and Political Pragmatism, 21 TRANSFORMATION 94 (1993); AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977); DONALD
HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); Walter, supra note 27; Suzanne Werner,
The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issue, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renego-
tiating the Terms, 43 AM. J. POL. ScI. 912 (1999).
31. Hartzell & Hoddie, supra note 27, at 318.
32. Id. at 18, 321.
33. Id. at 330. In the short term, power-sharing worked in Liberia in 1997; thereafter
Charles Taylor was elected to the presidency. Sharing power succeeded again as a short-term
measure to halt conflict between the Government and LURD and MODEL in the run-up to the
October 11, 2005, elections. Nevertheless, power-sharing has not remedied the root causes of
Liberia's legacy of conflict. Variants of power-sharing have also been successful in, among
other places, Ethiopia, under a system of ethnic federalism, and in Fiji and Sudan. See gener-
ally JEREMY I. LEVITT, THE EVOLUTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT IN LIBERIA: FROM
"PATERNALTARIANISM" TO STATE COLLAPSE 26 (2005); THE FIJi CONSTITUTION REVIEW
COMMISSION, PARLIAMENT OF FIJI, THE FiJI ISLANDS: TOWARDS A UNITED FUTURE (Parlia-
mentary Paper No. 34, 1996) (located in the library of the Lauterpacht Center for Research in
International Law, Cambridge, United Kingdom); The Implementation Modalities of the Pro-
tocol Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on Implementation
Modalities of the Protocols and the Agreements on Power Sharing, Naivasha, Kenya, Dec. 31
2004, available at http://www.usip.orglibrary/pa/sudan/cpaO0O92005/cpatoc.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 20, 2005).
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engineering can help construct a democratic political system capable of
withstanding the centrifugal tendencies that tear deeply divided societies
apart.""3 Without power-sharing, rebels and warlords may have no incen-
tive to negotiate peace and will return to the battlefield for fear of
political, economic, and social disenfranchisement. In this sense, some
scholars argue, weak governments share power to stop unwinnable wars.
This assertion supports the popular notion that peace without power-
sharing may not be realistic or attainable.
B. Arguments Against Power-Sharing
The most fundamental argument against power-sharing appears in
domestic, regional, subregional, and international law and policy: rebels,
warlords, and other abusers who have sponsored or directed atrocities or
sought to capture state power violently and undemocratically for eco-
nomic rewards, political power, or any other reason have committed
domestic and international crimes. It follows that peace agreements, irre-
spective of amnesty, should not empower these individuals to rule over
their victims or wreak further havoc with the legitimacy of state author-
ity.35 The argument against power-sharing rejects the ludicrous
assumption, inherent in the practice, that warlords and rebels are intent
on becoming practicing democrats and further asserts that power-sharing
sends the signal to other would-be rebels that violence is a viable way to
obtain political power.
Hence, just as the failure to prosecute persons who have committed
international crimes may encourage further atrocities and eventually
vigilantism, power-sharing with rebels in deeply scarred and divided
societies may generate more rebellion, random and violent reactions
from civil society, or militant opposition from aggrieved citizens. Power-
sharing in postwar contexts connotes something far more difficult than
sharing power with political opponents; it perhaps unrealistically neces-
sitates a societal psychology of forgiveness and with it the ability of
citizens to live and work peacefully with their enemies. As is the case in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, power-sharing may generate "feelings of dis-
trust towards the new government and the political system, and
encourage cynicism towards the rule of law."36 The hurdle of legitimacy,
particularly as it relates to which factions will acquire authority over key
government portfolios (foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, internal
security, justice, and natural resources), could undermine a peaceful po-
34. Sisk, supra note 7, at 77.
35. There should, however, be no bar to amnestied rebel groups lawfully and democ-
ratically competing for political power.
36. Majzub, supra note 25, at 251.
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litical transition. As one analyst notes, "[i]n civil war contexts, power
sharing is equated with making a deal with the devil, and thus such
deals, even when they are forged, are unlikely to last. Power-sharing
agreements, then, fail where they are most needed."
37 Nowhere was this
more apparent than in the Lomd Agreement, which awarded Corporal
Foday Sankoh, the reviled and brutal leader of the RUF, the status of
vice president and chairman of the Board of the Commission for the
Management of Strategic Resources, National, Reconstruction, and De-
velopment (CMRRD)3 The Agreement also conferred on the RUF the
cabinet posts of finance, foreign affairs, and justice. 9 As the following
analysis will show, power-sharing under Lom6 largely failed because it
was an artificial and unstable way to form a government in a violently
divided society-artificial power-sharing does not resolve conflict and
deep-seated cleavages but rather displaces them or disguises the more
iniquitous intentions of contestants.40 As David Wippman notes in his
essay on "ethnic power-sharing," sharing power often proves "inefficient,
unstable, and short-lived" and "may interfere with the ability of the
population of the state as a whole to determine its form of government
and political affiliations."'
Power-sharing becomes even more problematic when it relates to se-
curity. While disarmament and demobilization initiatives are vital to
peace and security, the more difficult question concerns the loyalties of
ex-combatants. Sharing power with warlords, especially responsibility
for the security sector, is dangerous when there are divided loyalties
among the ex-combatants, who will, as is the case in Liberia, serve as
the backbone of the new military and greatly impact its culture. As is
often the case in Africa, combatants have been trained to be loyal to in-
dividuals as opposed to the state; hence, power-sharing opens the door
for warlords to manipulate, mobilize, and leverage old loyalties for po-
litical ends. This in part explains why "[s]ince 1945, only one-third of
negotiated settlements of so-called 'identity civil wars'-i.e., ethnic
conflicts-have resulted in a lasting peace. 42 From this background,
37. Ian S. Spears, Africa: The Limits of Power-sharing, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 123, 127
(2002).
38. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Lom6, Togo, July 7, 1999, available at
http://www.sierra-leone.orglomeaccord.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [Lomd Agreement].
39. Id. See also Spears, supra note 37, at 123.
40. Spears, supra note 37, at 123.
41. David Wippman, Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Powersharing, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 212-13 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
42. Crocker & Hampson, supra note 18, at 55. See also Roy Licklider, The Conse-
quences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 681, 686
(1995).
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power-sharing with warlords and rebels may not only be unlawful but
also bad policy.
The next Part discusses briefly the rationale behind this Article's ex-
amination of the Accra and Lom6 peace accords of Liberia and Sierra
Leone, respectively.
III. WHY LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE?
Few states have as much in common as Liberia and Sierra Leone.
They are so similar that the historical and contemporary experiences of
each illuminate the other. Liberia and Sierra Leone border one another in
West Africa. The states are of similar size-an estimated 43,000 square
miles for Liberia and 29,000 for Sierra Leone. They share a similar for-
est belt environment, climatic conditions, and natural fauna. Liberia has
a human population of approximately 3.4 million; Sierra Leone, 6 mil-
lion. 3
Great Britain established Freetown in Sierra Leone in 1787, and the
United States and private interests founded Monrovia in Liberia in
1822." Both states are the product of colonial resettlement schemes
where, initially, "free blacks" in the United States and Great Britain and
its territories were sent back to West Africa to solve the perceived prob-
lem of their existence in slavocratic societies under U.S. and British
control.4 ' Emigrants from the United States and the Caribbean sup-
planted these initial populations, as did other blacks the British and U.S.
navies captured at sea and liberated once both states outlawed the slave
trade. 6
Liberia and Sierra Leone evolved on similar political, economic, and
social paths. The populations of both states were originally wholly West
African, 47 but enslavement inculcated a western orientation into the black
43. Liberia, CIA World Fact Book, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/li.html (last visited July 5, 2005).
44. CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE 6 (1976).
45. The predominant view at the time was that free blacks were "idle and useless and
too often vicious and mischievous" and needed to be relocated outside of the United States;
nevertheless, slave rebellions and the pivotal role free blacks played in organizing them seems
to have been the central rationale behind recolonization. LEVITT, supra note 33, ch. 2.
46. Great Britain and the United States abolished the human trade in 1807 and 1808,
respectively. The two states dumped those blacks captured at sea in their respective colonial
stations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the United States, many black emigrants were also
manumitted on the condition that they "immigrate" to Africa; Great Britain coerced many
blacks in the Caribbean to immigrate to Sierra Leone.
47. See generally CHEIKH ANTA Diop, PRECOLONIAL BLACK AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE POLITICAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND BLACK AFRICA FROM ANTIQUITY
TO THE FORMATION OF MODERN STATES (1987); PHILLIP CURTIN, THE AFRICAN SLAVE
TRADE: A CONSENSUS (1969).
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settlers of Monrovia and Freetown. The New World emigrants became
the ruling elite and were known as Americo-Liberians in Liberia and
Creoles in Sierra Leone. This may in part explain why both states had
and to some degree still have similar political cultures and developmen-
tal paths. Christopher Clapham notes that Liberia and Sierra Leone
share the peculiar legacy of Creoledom, and the late nineteenth-
century expansion from the coastal settlements into a hinterland
itself divided between numerous ethnic groups; they have analo-
gous administrative hierarchies, and distributions of educational
and professional skills; and they have similar economies, based
principally on the export of primary materials-especially min-
erals-by foreign-managed corporations, and only relying to a
41
secondary extent on indigenously-produced cash crops.
Thus, Liberia and Sierra Leone share common borders, natural envi-
ronments, historical origins, ethnic populations, and political, economic,
and social structures.
49
Today Liberia and Sierra Leone have as much in common as they
did in the past. Unfortunately, their troubled legacy of conflict and un-
derdevelopment is perhaps the most striking similarity. Since the early
1990s, both states have suffered from intermittent warfare and state col-
lapse. Despite their best efforts, neither has been able to establish a
"rights conception of democracy," in which, James Crawford notes, "it is
not enough that the government of the day has been elected, in the com-
paratively recent past, at a general election. Democracy implies a range
of rights to participate in public life, effective freedom of speech, the
opportunity to organize political parties and other groups."'50 Authoritari-
anism and conflict in both states have stifled the development of a
democratic political culture. Liberia was immersed in deadly civil con-
flict from 1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003." Sierra Leone was embroiled
in war from 1991 to 1996 and 1999 to 2002.52 During these periods both
48. CLAPHAM, supra note 44, at 1-2. One novel distinction between Liberia and Sierra
Leone was that the United States adopted a racist policy of indifference toward Liberia and
had little political and economic interest in the state, which forced Liberia to survive and exist
on its own; conversely, Sierra Leone was a colony of Great Britain, governed and maintained
by a colonial administration and secured by a British naval base. In this context, while the
political culture and development of the two states are similar, they are also distinct-a subject
that goes beyond the scope of the present analysis. For more information, see Clapham, supra
note 44.
49. For an excellent analysis of the political and historical similarities between the two
states, see Clapham, supra note 44.
50. Crawford, supra note 24, at 116.
51. LEVITT, supra note 33, ch. 7.
52. See Alfred B. Zack Williams, Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone, 28
REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 73 (2001); Alfred B. Zack Williams, Kamajors, "Sobel" and the
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states were destabilized by warlordism, prolonged and brutally savage
insurgencies, democratic elections without democratic transitions, vio-
lent coups, poor economic growth, extremely high unemployment, acute
poverty, rampant corruption, and perpetual insecurity.
To make matters worse, since the 1990s the character of conflict in
Liberia and Sierra Leone has changed into a type of warlord politics
where clandestine economic networks and systems compete for state
power and "political authority and command over resources come
mainly through the decisions of specific individuals who act to serve
their private interests, largely without regard for formal government in-
stitutions, rules, and processes."53 Political insecurity in these states
prevents those individuals who resist the prerogatives of warlords and
their cohorts from relying on any central authority or institutions to im-
pose order and preserve the rule of law, safeguard basic civil and
political rights, and arbitrate and resolve conflict. In these situations,
those who resist the "politics of the belly" are forced to rely on their own
54power, tactical advantage, and alliances to ensure security and prosper-
ity.5 If, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, governments lack the power to
thwart rebellion, they are forced to enter into peace agreements that re-
quire, among other things, power-sharing. Liberia and Sierra Leone are
among the best examples, then, of states that enter, out of political ne-
cessity and expediency, peace agreements involving comprehensive
political power-sharing with warlords who have no regard for the rule of
law.
From this background, it is evident that the Accra and Lome peace
agreements were born out of analogous historical phenomena and politi-
cal circumstances in like times and in similar environments. Part IV
shows that the structure and substance of the accords are nearly identi-
cal, as were the affairs that molded them. While this Article's analysis
draws on several peace processes inside and outside Africa, it focuses on
the Accra and Lom6 accords because the case studies clarify and com-
plement one another and because comparative analysis is best suited to
expose political behavior and normative legal developments over short
periods of time. To that end, the following Part examines the state of af-
fairs responsible for birthing the Accra and Lom6 peace agreements.
Militariat: Civil Society & The Return of The Military in Sierra Leonean Politics, 24 REv.
AFR. POL. ECON. 373 (1997); Alfred B. Zack Williams, The Political Economy of Civil War in
Sierra Leone, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 143 (1999).
53. WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES iX (1998).
54. See generally J.M. BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA -THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY
(1993).
55. Id. at x.
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IV. THE CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE
The conflicts that gave rise to the Accra and Lomd peace accords are
complex and multifaceted. They have been the subjects of countless
studies, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss them in de-
tail.56 It is, however, important to contextualize the circumstances that
produced the accords before analyzing them.
The Accra and Lom6 peace accords were born out of 11 and 18
years, respectively, of unfettered war and state collapse. As was previ-
ously mentioned, Liberia was entangled in deadly civil conflict from
1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003. Sierra Leone was enmeshed in war from
1991 to 1996 and 1999 to 2002. The conflicts that besieged these states
were among the most violent, cruel, and bloody internal wars of the
twentieth century. 7 It is estimated that since 1990 there have been over
250,000 war-related fatalities in Liberia and 75,000 in Sierra Leone."
While the seeds of conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone can be traced
to historical circumstances, the conflicts that generated the Accra and
Lom6 accords are products of contemporary and complex local, domes-
tic, regional, and international phenomena.59 The following sections
briefly discuss them.
A. Conflict and State Collapse
A group of indigenous military elements, led by Master Sergeant
Samuel K. Doe of the Krahn ethnic group, permanently altered the Libe-
rian political order in 1980 when it removed the True Whig Party, which
had dominated the state's political and economic order since its inde-
pendence in 1847, from power in a violent coup d'6tat.Wo Doe's forces
executed Liberian president William R. Tolbert and 27 key government
56. See generally LEIvrr, supra note 33; J. PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A
FAILED STATE (2004); ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR: NIGERIA, ECOMOG, AND
REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA (2002); ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST
AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU (2002); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, TACKLING LIBERIA: THE EYE OF THE REGIONAL STORM, AFRICAN REPORT 62 (2003);
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE: THE STATE OF SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE,
AFRICAN REPORT 67 (2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE, SOWING TERROR:
ATROCITIES AGAINST CIVILIANS IN SIERRA LEONE, (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS OVERVIEW: LIBERIA (2004), available at http:l/hrw.org/english/docs/2004/Ol/21/
liberi6977.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
57. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 206-44; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE, Sow-
ING TERROR, supra note 56.
58. LEVITT, supra note 33; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE, SOWING TERROR,
supra note 56.
59. See generally ADEBAJO, supra note 56.
60. Liberia, AFR. RES. BULL., Apr. 1-30, 1980, at 5645.
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officials, particularly those of Americo-Liberian origin.6' Doe and his
advisors established the People's Redemption Council (PRC), which
served as the government's new controlling body.62
Doe instituted a brutal form of military rule and politicized ethnicity
in such a manner that it became inculcated into every facet of Liberian
society.6 His Krahn ethnic group quickly dominated Liberia's political,
economic, and military sectors, leading to tension and eventually low-
intensity conflict with other ethnic groups, in particular the Mano and
Gio groups. 64 Doe barred all political opposition and rigged the 1985
elections. 6 As the political situation worsened, so did the quality of life
for most Liberians. Increased civil society discontent and protest led to
widespread human rights abuses, corruption, and the use of the security
services to silence all detractors. 66
After several attempts to topple Doe failed, on December 24, 1989, a
small band of rebels led by Charles Taylor, Doe's former director-
general of the General Services Agency, invaded Liberia from C6te
d'Ivoire. 6 Taylor's group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), which Libya supported, sought to oust Doe from power and
within five months seized control of 90 percent of the state.68 The inva-
sion evolved into a popular insurgency composed of a multiethnic
coalition of anti-Doe elements. The insurgency initially had some popu-
lar support, but as it became bloodier and more destructive, Liberians
disavowed it and its shameless leader. The rebellion marked the begin-
ning of what was to become the Liberian Civil War.
The historical circumstances that led to conflict in Liberia mirror the
factors that caused violent conflict and state collapse in Sierra Leone. In
bitterly contested elections in March 1967, the All Peoples Congress
(APC) won the election, and Siaka Stevens, leader of the APC and
mayor of Freetown, was declared the new prime minister.69 Shortly
thereafter, Brigadier David Lansana, commander of the Republic of Si-
erra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), placed Stevens under house arrest,
apparently because he believed the election should await formal approval
61. Id.
62. Id.






69. Ibrahim Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the
Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone, 36 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 203, 206 (1998).
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of traditional leaders in Parliament. ° Over the course of a few weeks two
more military coups took place,7' the last of which is referred to as the
Sergeants' Revolt. Stevens eventually assumed the office of prime minis-
ter in April 1968 in accordance with the state's constitution.72 These
events, among others, compelled Stevens to rule authoritatively and
crush all political opposition. He instituted measures to preserve APC
supremacy, including an amendment to the 1978 constitution, and
banned all political parties except his own, marking the advent of one-
party rule.73
In October 1985 Stevens's chosen successor, Major General Joseph
Saidu Momoh, was elected president in a one-party referendum. 4 Al-
though Momoh made politically insignificant overtures in support of
multiparty politics, he sought to rule with an iron fist, curbing political
opposition and public dissent.75 In March 1991 the elitist and exclusion-
ary character of APC rule, among other factors, spawned a small rebel
group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by a former cor-
poral, Foday Sankoh . The exact purpose of the RUF was not known,
but after attacking several villages in eastern Sierra Leone along the bor-
der with Liberia, the group quickly became notorious for brutal
violence.77 After successfully defeating RSLMF forces on the battlefield
numerous times, the RUF acquired a reputation as an efficient fighting
force and cashed in on its success by seizing control of several diamond
mines in the Kono district.78 On April 29, 1992, separate and apart from
the RUF campaign against Momoh and the APC, Captain Valentine
Strasser and a group of junior military officers led a successful coup
against Momoh's government, sending him into exile in Guinea.79
70. Williams, The Political Economy of Civil War in Sierra Leone, supra note 52, at
144.
71. Id.
72. A. M. Lavalie, Government and Opposition in Sierra Leone, 1968-78, in SIERRA
LEONE STUDIES AT BIRMINGHAM 77-106 (A. Jones & P.K. Mitchell eds., 1985).
73. Abdullah, supra note 69, at 206.
74. Williams, supra note 70, at 145;
75. Id. at 146.
76. Williams, supra note 70, at 147-49; Sierra Leone: UN Held Hostage, AFR. RES.
BULL., May 1-31, 2000, at 13982; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to
the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 1, U.N. Doc. S/1995/975, Nov. 21,
1995.
77. Sierra Leone: The Captain in His Bunker, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Feb. 3, 1995, at 1;
Williams, Child Soldiers, supra note 52, at 73-82.
78. Sierra Leone: RUF Attacks Precede Peace Talks, AlR. RES. BULL., March 1-31,
1996, at 12202; Coup Bid Tarnishes Diamonds'Luster, AFR. ANALYSIS, Oct. 6, 1995.
79. It appears that unpaid salaries and low morale were key causes of the coup. Sierra
Leone: UN Held Hostage, supra note 76, at 13982; Sierra Leone: Strasser in Exile, AFR. RES.
BULL., May 1-31, 1996, at 12278.
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Strasser and his cohorts established the National Provisional Ruling
Council (NPRC) as the ruling authority in Sierra Leone. °
Immediately challenged by the RUF, the NPRC was unable to assert
effective control over the state. By mid-1995 the RUF had control of
most of Sierra Leone, except for Freetown,8' and its barbarous treatment
of Sierra Leoneans earned it an infamous reputation. 2 The NPRC then
hired Executive Outcomes, a private security firm (i.e., mercenary com-
pany) based in South Africa, to halt the RUF advance and help the
government reestablish effective control of the state.83
The lack of popularity of the NPRC and growing international scru-
tiny of the Strasser regime ultimately led to presidential and
parliamentary elections in April 1996, where Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a
longtime UN diplomat and leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party
(SLPP), won the presidential election and most parliamentary seats.4
Kabbah's victory, however, was short-lived; on May 25, 1997, junior
soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma ousted him from power. The
junta referred to itself as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC).85
As the next section will illustrate, violent challenges to the regimes
of Doe and Kabbah and ensuing conflict eventually led to peace en-
forcement operations by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997.
B. The ECOWAS Interventions
The ECOWAS intervened in Liberia in August 1990 and succeeded
in halting Taylor's advance on Monrovia. 6 Prince Yormie Johnson-who
had been a member of Taylor's NPFL but broke away because of internal
power struggles--created the infamous Independent National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (INPFL). On September 9, 1990, Johnson's forces kid-
80. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 76, at 1.
81. Id.
82. The RUF's brutalization of Sierra Leoneans is best evidenced in its apology to the
nation, in which it stated:
In the process of cleaning the system, however, we have wronged the great majority
of our countrymen. We have sinned both in the sight of our Sierra Leonean brothers
and sisters for all the terror and the mayhem we unleashed on you in our bid to
make Sierra Leone a country that all Sierra Leoneans would be proud of.
Revolutionary United Front's Apology to the Nation (SLBS radio broadcast, June 18,
1997), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/rufapology.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2005).
83. Sierra Leone: No Soldier Saviors, Arz. CONFIDENTIAL, Oct. 6, 1995, at 5.
84. Sierra Leone: Falling Out Parade, Ant. CONFIDENTIAL, Mar. 29, 1996, at 4.
85. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 207.




napped Doe, who was attending a meeting at the ECOWAS headquarters
in Monrovia, and later savagely killed him.87 Doe's murder created a po-
litical vacuum that generated further instability.
With the assistance of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity
(now the African Union (AU)), and other institutions, an Interim Gov-
ernment of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in The Gambia in
October 1990, and Dr. Amos C. Sawyer became its president. Because
Taylor had wanted to be president, he refused to work with IGNU and
continued to escalate the war.89 The civil war created many cleavages in
Liberian society, and by 1992 several new warring factions emerged, all
of which were gradually incorporated into IGNU. Between 1992 and
1997, after several years of cease-fires and peace accords and three tran-
sitional governments, Taylor remained an impediment to peace and
would not negotiate in good faith; given the poor prospect of a military
solution with the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
on the ground, Taylor finally agreed to the formation of a five-person
transitional government in September 1996. 90 On July 19, 1997, special
elections were held. Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party
(NPP) emerged victorious with 75 percent of the vote. Liberians appear
to have voted for Taylor because they feared he would reignite the war if
he lost.9'
Unlike the situation in Liberia, where Doe's ouster from power was
widely celebrated by nearly all facets of Liberian society, Sierra Leone-
ans publicly protested against Kabbah's removal from power and it was
universally condemned by the UN,9 the broader international commu-
nity, and the Organization of African Unity,93 which set a surprising
precedent when it requested ECOWAS to employ force to reverse the
coup.94 In response, ECOMOG intervened and succeeded in permanently
87. LEVITr, supra note 33, at 208.
88. Id.
89. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 208-09.
90. The leaders of the main warring factions, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George
Boley, and Roosevelt Johnson selected Ruth Perry as chairperson of the transitional govern-
ment's State Council-the first African woman to be head of state. Liberia State Council
Chairwoman Ruth Perry, AFR. RES. BULL., Sept. 1-30, 1996, at 12395.
91. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 210.
92. Sierra Leone: Nigerian Troops Take Freetown, AFR. RES. BULL., Feb. 1-28, 1998,
at 12991A; Sierra Leone: Nigerian Intervention Fails, AFR. RES. BULL., June 1-30, 1997, at
12733.
93. Id.
94. The ECOWAS operation marked the first time a regional organization requested
intervention in a member state to end human suffering and promote democracy. Moreover, it
was also the first time a regional organization requested and arguably authorized another re-
gional organization to employ force on its behalf.
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removing the junta from power in March 1998." Thereafter Kabbah was
reinstated as president.96
Although ECOMOG was successful in ousting the junta, it was not
able to fully neutralize the RUE. 97 On January 6, 1999, the RUF attacked
Freetown with the objective of overthrowing the government. The feroc-
ity of the attack surprised ECOMOG forces. After weeks of fighting and
thousands of deaths, mostly civilian, ECOMOG repelled the group.98 On
July 7, at the behest of the ECOWAS, the UN, and the United States, and
after months of peace talks and tense negotiations, the government of
Sierra Leone and RUF entered into the Lom6 Agreement," which most
Sierra Leoneans begrudged because of its amnesty and power-sharing
provisions.
The fragile settlements achieved in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with
their hearty brew of amnesty and power-sharing, did not bring about last-
ing peace and, as the next section highlights, conflict and violence
ultimately resumed.
C. Resumption of War
In the years following Taylor's accession to power, the political and
economic situation in Liberia continued to decline. '° Liberians remained
as poor and disenfranchised as they had been during the war. Taylor used
violence to control opposition groups, silence media criticism, and
thwart internal NPP challenges to his authority.'0 ' Endemic corruption,
high unemployment, illiteracy, and a lack of government investment in
basic infrastructure, including clean water, electricity, schools, hospitals,
roads, and agricultural production, made Taylor's regime very unpopular.
Moreover, his exploitation of Liberia's natural resources for personal
gain and support for the RUF's vicious insurgency in Sierra Leone
greatly damaged his credibility.'0 2
By April 1999 Taylor was faced with a formidable armed insurrec-
tion from the northern border area of Guinea.' 3 The rebel groups were
95. Sierra Leone: Nigerian Intervention Fails, supra note 92, at 12733.
96. Sierra Leone: Kabbah Returns, Aii. RES. BULL., Mar. 1-31, 1998, at 13055.
97. Sierra Leone: Rebels Hang On, AFR. REs. BULL., July 1-31, 1998, at 13190.
98. Sierra Leone: Hundreds Flee Freetown as Fighting Flares, Ant. REs. BULL., Jan.
1-31, 1999, at 13387-88.
99. Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38.
100. Endnote Dateline: Liberia, AIR. ANALYSIS, Aug. 22, 1997.
101. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 212-13; Liberia: Abductions and Accusations, Ant. REs.
BULL., July 1-30, 1998, at 13190.
102. See LEVITT, supra note 33, at 215-16; Liberia: Taylorland Under Siege, Ant. CON-
FIDENTIAL, Feb. 19, 1999, at 6-7; Liberia: Old Habits Die Hard, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 9,
2001, at 1-3.
103. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 216-17.
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largely composed of former factional elements from the Liberian Civil
War. °" By June 2003 rebel groups calling themselves the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) captured most of the state and suc-
cessfully neutralized Liberian government forces.'0 5 During the fighting,
the government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL committed egregious
atrocities against one another and the civilian population.,E
Meanwhile Taylor was plagued by other problems, including intense
international scrutiny over his support of the RUF in Sierra Leone, con-
tinued UN sanctions, and his inability to receive military support or
purchase weapons from his closest ally, President Blaise Compaore of
Burkina Faso, and from his long-term supporter, Muammar Qadhafi of
Libya.'0 7 These factors ultimately dealt his regime a death blow and
forced it to negotiate peace with LURD and MODEL. On July 17, 2003,
the government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL signed a cease-fire
agreement that laid the groundwork for the Accra Agreement.' °8 Never-
theless, the parties did not honor the agreement, and in the weeks that
followed, fighting resumed, reaching the streets of Monrovia.
On August 11, 2003, under severe international pressure from the
United States, Europe, and ECOWAS, President Taylor resigned office
and departed into exile in Nigeria.'9 This allowed ECOWAS to eventu-
ally deploy a 3,600-strong peacekeeping mission in Liberia (ECOWAS
Mission in Liberia or ECOMIL). On August 18 the government of Libe-
ria, LURD, and MODEL entered into the Accra Agreement, which
provided for de facto amnesty and comprehensive power-sharing and
laid the framework for the establishment of the National Transitional
Government of Liberia (NTGL)." ° On August 21 the warring parties
104. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 217-18, 223.
105. UN sanctions against Liberia curbed Taylor's ability to obtain weapons and arm his
fighters.
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOUTH, POVERTY AND BLOOD: THE LETHAL LEGACY OF
WEST AFRicA's REGIONAL WARRIORS (2005).
107. LEVITT, supra note 33, at 223.
108. Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of
the Republic of Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the
Movement for Democracy in Liberia, Accra, Ghana, June 17, 2003, available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/liberianceasefireagreement.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) [here-
inafter Agreement on Ceasefire].
109. Moses Blah, Taylor's vice president, assumed the presidency until the Transitional
Government was instituted on October 14, 2003, in accordance with article 20(b) of the Accra
Agreement.
110. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia (GOL), The
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy
in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties, Accra, Ghana, Aug. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/libefia_08182003_cpa.html [hereinafter Accra Agree-
ment].
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elected Gyude Bryant, a well-known businessman, as chair and Wesley
Johnson as vice chair of the NTGL. On September 19 the UN Security
Council adopted resolution 1509, establishing the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) to, among other activities, support the implementation of the
Accra Agreement by guaranteeing security and support for humanitarian
relief and human rights activities, assist in national security reform, train
police, and build a new military."' The UNMIL eventually comprised a
15,000-person peacekeeping mission.
The transitional government assumed power on October 14, 2003.
The NTGL remained in power until January 2006, when Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf, the winner of the state's November 8, 2005, presidential run-off
election,"2 took office alongside the winners of the October 11, 2005,
congressional elections.
Circumstances in Sierra Leone paralleled those in Liberia. The
state's transition to peace failed, and the resumption of hostilities led to
UN intervention and a delicate peace that remains to the present. In Si-
erra Leone, the Lom6 Agreement served as the only legitimate
framework for peace, providing for, among other things, a general am-
nesty for and power-sharing with the RUE The Agreement empowered
ECOMOG to enforce the peace until a UN-sanctioned mission replaced
it. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, with an initial force of 6,000
troops."3 Initially the bulk of UNAMSIL troops were "converted" blue
helmet ECOMOG forces; later, contingents from outside of Africa
joined.' 4 The ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone ceased in April 2000,
and immediately thereafter the RUF went on the offensive, attacking vil-
lages and assaulting hundreds of UNAMSIL personnel and holding them
hostage."' The RUF also seized UNAMSIL arms, equipment, and am-
munition. After the RUF killed civilian protestors and generally wrought
havoc in Freetown, the UN was able to repel the group and calm the
situation." 6 On May 19, 2000, the UN arrested Sankoh and other senior
RUF members and forbade the group from participating in govern-
111. S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003).
112. Jeremy I. Levitt, First Female President Could Inspire Liberia, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2005, at 26.
113. Sierra Leone: UN Force Deployed, AFR. RES. BULL., Dec. 1-31, 1999, at 13808;
Sierra Leone: "Very Fragile" Peace, AFR. RES. BULL., Jan. 1-31, 2000, at 13842.
114. Sierra Leone: "Very Fragile" Peace, supra note 113.
115. Sierra Leone: UN Held Hostage, supra note 76, at 13979.
116. Id.
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ment. ' 17 All senior RUF government officials were relieved of their posi-
tions.' 'I
In the years that followed, fighting between government forces and
the RUF continued unabated, resulting in several additional cease-fire
agreements."'9 The government of Guinea also launched several attacks
against RUF bases in Sierra Leone to halt RUF attacks against Liberian
dissidents in Guinea. By May 2001 the UN and the government of Sierra
Leone made significant headway in neutralizing the RUF and stabilizing
the state. On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah lifted the four-year
state of emergency and declared the civil war 
officially over.120
D. Conclusion
It is evident that the circumstances that produced the civil wars in
Liberia and Sierra Leone were complex, multifarious, and involved a
variety of local, subregional, regional, and international actors. The Ac-
cra and Lom6 accords were born out of similar historical and political
contexts, including a legacy of authoritarian rule, acute underdevelop-
ment, warlord politics, internal disorder, perpetual state breakdown,
grave human atrocities, UN inaction, intermittent conflict, and subre-
gional intervention. In order to understand the foregoing analysis, it is
important to situate the accords' power-sharing provisions in context.
V. THE ACCRA AND LOMg AccoRDs
This Part broadly highlights the sum and substance of the Accra and
Lom6 accords, with a special emphasis on their political power-sharing
provisions.' Each accord is composed of 37 articles similar in structure
and content. Although the Lom6 Agreement (May 25, 1999) served as a
template for the Accra Agreement (August 18, 2003), the latter is some-
what more detailed and comprehensive than the former and includes
117. Sierra Leone II, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, June 9, 2000, at 3; Sierra Leone: The Cost of
Kabbah, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Mar. 9, 2001, at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id. See also Sierra Leone: New Ceasefire Agreement, AFR. RES. BULL., May 1-3 1,
2001, at 14417.
120. USAMSIL Press Release, President and Special Representative Attend Symbolic
Destruction of Weapons in Makeni, Jan. 20, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
unamsillDB/200102.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006). See also Sierra Leone: Sankoh in Court,
AFE. RES. BULL., Mar. 1-31, 2002, at 14791.
121. It is beyond the scope of the Article to examine all of the provisions in the accords.
It should also be noted that the Accra Agreement was not the first accord concerning Liberia
to include a form of power-sharing. The earlier Abuja Agreement (Aug. 19, 1995), Akosombo
Agreement (Sept. 12, 1994), and Conotou Agreement (July 25, 1993) all included power-
sharing components.
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special provisions for an international stabilization force,12 a process for
troop disengagement, 3 the restructuring of the Liberian National Police,
and the establishment of a Governance Reform Commission. 4 Con-
versely, the Lom6 Agreement is more oriented toward the well-being of
victims of war than the Accra Agreement; it provides for a special vic-
tims' fund, 2 1 free basic education, 26 and affordable healthcare. 12
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the provisions of both accords can be
divided into five substantive categories: cease-fire, military, human
rights, implementation, and power-sharing.
A. Cease-fire
The Accra and Lom6 agreements called for an immediate cease-
fire,' an end to armed conflict between the warring parties,129 and the
establishment of a cease-fire monitoring group and joint monitoring
committees."O Both agreements sanctioned ECOWAS-ECOMOG to en-
force their terms.' Finally, based on its peacekeeping experiences in
Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS also ensured the
Accra Agreement provided for "a zone of separation between the bellig-
erent forces" or "safe corridor ... for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and free movement of persons.' 32
B. Military
The accords have comprehensive military components, including the
disbandment of irregular forces; 3 3 disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration schemes; 134 the restructuring and creation of new national
armies and security services composed of former members of warring
factions;" 5 provisions for the security, safety, and freedom of movement
122. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 3.
123. Disengagement of forces means the "immediate breaking of tactical contact be-
tween opposing military forces of the GOL [Government of Liberia], the LURD, and the
MODEL, at places where they are in direct contact or within range of direct fire weapons."
See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 5(2).
124. Id., arts. 10,16.
125. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 29.
126. Id. art. 31.
127. Id.
128. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 2; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 1.
129. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, arts. 2, 3; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 2.
130. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 3; Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 2.
131. Accra Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 3, 4; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 3.
132. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 3(1).
133. Id. arts. 6-8; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 13-20.
134. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 13-20.
135. Id.
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of peacekeeping forces; 3 6 and the establishment of joint monitoring
commissions. 37 They also envisaged the UN succeeding ECOMOG after
the security situation in both states stabilized.' One distinct feature of
the Lom6 Agreement is article 18 on the withdrawal of mercenaries of
"any guise," whether domestic or foreign; such an article would also
have been useful in the Accra Agreement, given the role of RUF merce-
naries in escalating the Liberian Civil War.'39
C. Human Rights
The Accra and Lom6 agreements required the warring factions to re-
spect, protect, and guarantee the fundamental human rights of the
citizens of Liberia and Sierra Leone in accordance with prevailing na-
tional law and broader human rights principles contained in UN, AU,
and ECOWAS law.' ° At a minimum, the accords defined basic civil and
political rights to include "the right to life and liberty, freedom from tor-
ture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression, and
association, and the right to take part in the governance of one coun-
try.' 4' The accords also called for the immediate and unconditional
release of prisoners of war and abductees and the voluntary repatriation
and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.142 The Ac-
cra and Lom6 agreements required all warring parties to respect
international humanitarian law, especially the prohibition against using
child combatants,'43 and provided for "safe and unhindered access by all
humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout the 
country."'"
Both Accra and Lom6 provided for the establishment of national human
rights and truth and reconciliation commissions and recognized the im-
portance of robust post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction
136. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 4; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38,
arts. 13-15.
137. Accra Agreement, supra note 10, art. 3; Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 2.
138. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 4; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38,
arts. 13-15.
139. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 18.
140. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 12; Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38,
art. 24.
141. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 12(1)(b); Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38,
art. 14(2) (emphasis added).
142. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, arts. 9-11, 14, 15, 30, 31; Lomd Agreement,
supra note 38, arts. 21-23. The Lom6 Agreement specifically recognizes the right of asylum
of Sierra Leoneans,whereas the Accra Agreement does not.
143. Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 30. The Accra and Lom accords differ in that
the former does not make explicit reference to child combatants.
144. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 14(1)(a); Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38,
art. 27(2).
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schemes.1 4 1 In addition, the accords, particularly Lom6, also recognized
the special needs of women affected by war.
14 6
The Lom6 Agreement also obligated the government of Sierra Leone
to design and implement a special programmatic fund for the rehabilita-
tion of war victims' 7 and created a Commission for the Consolidation of
Peace (CCP) "to implement a post-conflict program that ensures recon-
ciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially war
victims. ' 14'8 The CCP was mandated to supervise and monitor the parties'
implementation of, and compliance with, the Lomd Agreement as it con-
cerned the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of
peace.9 Similarly, the Accra Agreement established the Governance and
Reform Commission (GRC) to promote the principles of good govern-
ance that ideally help guarantee respect for human rights.'
The Lomd Agreement also provided for the creation of a Council of
Elders and Religious Leaders, who supposedly were sanctioned to func-
tion in quasi-judicial and conflict mediation roles when there was "any
conflicting difference of interpretation ... of any Article" of the
"Agreement or its protocols."'"' The Agreement also overzealously pro-
vided for unattainable goals such as free compulsory basic education and
affordable primary healthcare to all Sierra Leoneans.'52 In contrast, the
Accra Agreement did not make any reference to education and health-
care or the role of traditional leaders in the peace process. While it
appears that the accords, particularly Lom6, sought to provide significant
human rights protections, they failed to create any form of criminal or
civil remedy for war victims.
D. Implementation
The Accra and Lom6 agreements required multifaceted and compre-
hensive implementation schemes to ensure their respective parties
implemented them in good faith. To this end, the Accra Agreement es-
145. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, arts. 12, 13, 29; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38,
arts. 24, 25, 28.
146. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 31; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38,
art. 38.
147. See Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 38.
148. The CCP was composed of two representatives of civil society and one representa-
tive from each of the three warring parties. Id. art. 6.
149. Id.
150. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 16. There is a more detailed discussion
of the GRC in the governance section.
151. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 8. Under this provision, all decisions of the
council are binding and public and may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
152. See id. art. 31.
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tablished a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC),'53 the International Im-
plementation Committee (IMC),'- and the International Contact Group
on Liberia (ICGL),"5 and the Lom6 Agreement set up a Joint Implemen-
tation Committee (JIG) for Sierra Leone.5 6 All of the committees also
called for political support and economic assistance from states (e.g.,
moral guarantors) and for subregional (e.g., ECOWAS), regional (e.g.,
AU), and international (e.g., UN) institutions to assist in the implementa-
tion of the agreements and serve as its moral guarantors. 5 7 The Accra
and Lom6 agreements were to be registered and published for public
consumption,' 58 and they entered into force immediately upon signing by
the relevant parties.9
E. Power-Sharing
This section details and analyzes the power-sharing provisions in the
Accra and Lom6 accords. Because the agreements addressed a wide
spectrum of power-sharing issues, the analysis is divided into three ma-
jor sections: legal basis and authority of the agreements; governance; and
economic-related commissions.
As mentioned above, since political scientists and diplomats have
controlled the debate and practice of power-sharing, the standard
153. The JMC was established under the June 17, 2003, cease-fire agreement between
the Government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL. It was empowered to supervise and monitor
the terms of the cease-fire agreement and thereafter sanctioned under article 3(5) of the Accra
Agreement to resolve disputes concerning its implementation, investigate alleged violations of
the Agreement, and recommend remedial action for confirmed cease-fire violations. The JMC
was chaired by ECOWAS and included equal representation from the parties as well as repre-
sentatives from the UN, the AU, and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). The
JMC reported daily to ECOWAS Headquarters on its findings. Agreement on Ceasefire, supra
note 108.
154. The IMC shared a monitoring role with the JMC, as it was charged with "ensuring
effective and faithful implementation of the Peace Agreement" and approving the recommen-
dations of the JMC. IMC members included the ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, the European
Union, and the ICGL. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 3(5)(b).
155. The ICGL was established on September 17, 2002, "as part of a new political strat-
egy to address the continuing conflict situation [in Liberia]." The group included
representatives of the UN, the European Union, the AU, ECOWAS, United States, United
Kingdom, France, Senegal, Nigeria, and Morocco. Liberia: New Contact Group, New UN
Representative, UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORK, Sept. 18, 2002,
available at http://www.irinnews.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
156. The JIC consisted of members of the CCP, the Committee of Seven on Sierra
Leone, the Moral Guarantors as prescribed in article 34 of the Lomd Agreement, and other
international supporters. It was "responsible for reviewing and assessing the state of imple-
mentation of the Agreement" and making "recommendations deemed necessary to ensure
effective implementation" of the accord. Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 32.
157. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 33; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38,
arts. 32-35.
158. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 32(3); Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 36.
159. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 37; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 37.
Illegal Peace ?Winter 2006]
Michigan Journal of International Law
approach to dealing with states embroiled in internal deadly conflict,
particularly those involving international crimes, is to grant uncondi-
tional amnesty and share political power among all the warring
factions.'6 In these situations, amnesty is typically an essential prerequi-
site but a lesser-included element of power-sharing. 16' As previously
stated, however, power-sharing is all-encompassing, broader than am-
nesty, and more pertinent to long-term peace because it establishes the
framework for governance and determines the future constitution of or-
der in states and the potential for sustainable peace within them. Hence,
given their weighty impact on society, it is important to understand the
legal basis, if any, for the power-sharing provisions under the accords.
1. Legal Basis and Authority for Agreements
The Accra and Lom6 accords did not appear to offer any legal basis
or authority to legitimize their power-sharing provisions but rather pre-
scribed extralegal rules and processes for sharing power that abrogated
constitutionally-based superior rules. 62 The legitimizing authority for
power-sharing seems to have rested solely in the accords themselves. For
example, under article 35(1)(a) of the Accra Agreement, the formation of
the NTGL had its origins in paragraph 8(i) of the June 17, 2003, cease-
fire agreement between the Government of Liberia, LURD, and
160. Conflict resolution approaches of this type do not adequately consider the long-
term implications of power-sharing when there are successful insurgencies, rebellions, and
coups against lawfully constituted governments.
161. The Accra and Lomd accords include quasi- and full amnesty provisions under
articles 34 and 9, respectively. The Accra Agreement stops short of explicitly granting amnesty
but rather empowered the NTGL, which included warlords and rebels who committed or di-
rected atrocities, to consider a recommendation for "general amnesty to all persons and
parties" who were "engaged or involved in military activities during the Liberian civil conflict
that is the subject of the Agreement." See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 34. The Lomd
Agreement included an independent provision that obligated the government of Sierra Leone
to take "legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon." Id. art. 9(1). It
also granted "absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in
respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of
the present Agreement." Id. art. 9(2). Finally, the Agreement states that "for the cause of na-
tional reconciliation," Sierra Leone Government must ensure that "no official or judicial action
is taken against any member of the RUG/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything
done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March
1991, up to the signing of the present Agreement." Id. art. 9(3). Article 9 also required the
government to take legislative and other measures to guarantee the immunity of the warring
parties and ensure the "full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their rein-
tegration within a framework of full legality." Id. art. 9(3).
162. The Parliament of Sierra Leone adopted the Lom6 Peace Agreement (Ratification)
Act on July 15, 1999, nearly eight weeks after the coming into force of the Lom6 Agreement,
in order to provide a retroactive veil of legality over the extralegal accord. Nevertheless, the
Act seems to be unlawful because it conflicts with Sierra Leone's constitution-a fact that
casts further doubt on the lawfulness of the Agreement.
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MODEL. 63 The cease-fire agreement required that the peace accord (i.e.,
the Accra Agreement) provide for the "[flormation of a transitional gov-
ernment, which will not include the current President in accordance with
his June 4, 2003, declaration [to resign] in Accra, made at the inaugura-
tion of the 'ECOWAS Peace Talks.' ,,164 Furthermore, without referencing
any legal basis or authority, article 35 of the Accra Agreement stated that
the "[p]arties agree on the need for an extra-Constitutional arrangement
that will facilitate its [NTGL] formation and take into account the estab-
lishment and proper functioning of the entire transitional
arrangement.' '65 Article 35 implemented the extra-constitutional ar-
rangement by suspending:
* "provisions of the present Constitution of the Republic of Libe-
ria, the Statutes and all other Liberian laws, which relate to the
establishment, composition and powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and Judicial branches of the Government"'66; and
" "[flor the avoidance of doubt, relevant provisions of the Con-
stitutions, statutes and other laws of Liberia which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."'
67
The Accra Agreement also declared that all other provisions of the
1986 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia that were not suspended
would remain in force"r and that all suspended rules (e.g., constitution,
statutes, and other laws) under the Agreement would be "restored with
the inauguration of the elected Government by January 2006." '69 In this
sense, the suspension of the constitution of order under the Accra
Agreement was both temporary and permanent-while the 1986 consti-
tution remains relevant and in force, at least in part, the new political
order the Agreement established is permanent and irreversible.
The authority for power-sharing under the Lom6 Agreement is more
legally ambiguous than in the Accra Agreement. Article 10 of the Lom6
Agreement mandated that:
No constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the im-
plementation of the present Agreement, the Government of
Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to establish a Consti-
tutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the
163. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 35. See also Agreement on Ceasefire, supra
note 108, art. 8(i).
164. Agreement on Ceasefire, supra note 108, art. 8(i).
165. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 35(1)(a).
166. Id. art. 35(1)(b).
167. Id. art. 35(1)(c).
168. Id. art. 35(1)(d).
169. Id. art. 35(1)(e).
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present Constitution, and where deemed appropriate recommend
revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, Section
108 of the Constitution of 1991.170
In this sense, the Lomd Agreement had superior legal authority over
the Sierra Leone Constitution, yet paradoxically it recognized and sought
to abide by the constitution's terms when "recommending revisions and
amendments" to it.' In addition, article 10 is the only provision in the
Lom6 Agreement that specifically considers the relation of domestic
rules to the implementation of the power-sharing provisions in the
Agreement. 1
72
The only possible legally valid source of authority for the Lom6
Agreement in domestic law was the retroactive adoption of the Lom6
Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act of 1999 by the Parliament of Sierra
Leone several weeks after the Lom6 Agreement came into force.' The
legal problems associated with the timing and substance of this legisla-
tion are so abundant that it cannot be considered a legitimate and binding
act of Parliament. 74 On the international level, UN Security Council
resolutions welcomed the accords but did not expressly sanction their
substance.'75
2. Governance
The power-sharing provisions in the Accra and Lom6 agreements
contrast in an essential way. The Accra Agreement provided for a robust,
comprehensive, and all-encompassing form of power-sharing; it purged
the government of all former principal state officials and established a
new, albeit transitional, government apparatus composed of representa-
tives of the warring parties, political parties, and civil society groups.
170. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 10.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. The Lom Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act, July 15, 1999 (commencing on July
22, 1999).
174. The legal problems associated with the Act are discussed in Part V.
175. In fact, it can be argued that the UN did not sanction the Lom6 Agreement; rather,
the special representative of the UN secretary-general attached a reservation to the Agreement
stating that it interpreted article 9 concerning unconditional amnesty not to apply to "interna-
tional crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law." Michael Fleshman, Sierra Leone: Peacekeeping Under Fire,
AFR. RECOVERY, July 2000, at 8, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
subjindx/142peack.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005). There is also the corollary issue of
whether the UN Security Council possesses the legal authority to sanction agreements that
violate customary international law or preemptory jus cogens norms. Specifically, does the
UN Security Council have the legal authority to sanction peace deals with power-sharing
components that override a people's right of self-determination? This is a fertile area of re-
search in need of deep exploration.
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This may be deemed "hard" power-sharing. In contrast, the Lom6
Agreement only required the government of Sierra Leone to appoint
RUF leaders to senior- and junior-level cabinet positions.'7 6 It did not
require changes at the top levels of political leadership or in the judiciary
or legislature, as the senior bureaucracy at every level of government
remained intact. This type of arrangement may be deemed "soft" power-
sharing. Hence, the manner and extent to which a government shares
power determines whether observers can classify power-sharing as either
hard or soft. In this sense, the distinctions between hard and soft power-
sharing lie beyond the executive to encompass the legislative and judicial
branches of government as well.
The Accra Agreement provided for the establishment of a "Transi-
tional Government," which replaced the governing structure of the old
regime in entirety, temporarily refashioning the constitution of order.
7
Accra mandated the NTGL to "ensure scrupulous implementation" of
the Agreement, including execution of the June 17, 2003, cease-fire
agreement; 7 8 to oversee, coordinate, and implement the "political and
rehabilitation programs" agreed on in the Agreement; 79 to promote na-
tional reconciliation to restore peace and stability to the state and its
population;8 0 and to assist in the preparation of the October 2005 elec-
tions. " ' Under the Accra Agreement, the NTGL replaced Taylor's regime
and established three central branches of government:
1. A 76-member National Transitional Legislative Assembly
(NTLA), which took the place of the Liberian Legislature
(Government of Liberia: 12 seats; LURD: 12 seats; MODEL:
12 seats; political parties: 18 seats; civil society and special
interest groups: 15 seats; counties: 15 seats). 1
2
2. An executive headed by a transitional chairman and vice-
chairman and cabinet, which included 22 ministries and 22
public corporations divided among the warring factions, po-
litical parties, and civil society.'83
176. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 3-5.
177. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 21.
178. Id. arts. 22(1), 22(2)(a).
179. Id. art. 22(2)(b)
180. Id. art. 22(2)(c)
181. Id. art. 22(2)(d)
182. Id. art. 24.
183. Id. arts. 25-26. For a detailed account of the functional ministries, public corpora-
tions, and specific positions allocated to the warring parties, see Allocation of Cabinet
Positions, Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies/Commission Under the NTGL,
Annex 4 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia (GOL),
The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for
Winter 2006]
Michigan Journal of International Law
3. The Judiciary remained structurally intact, although article 27
of the Accra Agreement dismissed the whole of the existing
Supreme Court.
18 4
The Accra Agreement also created the Governance Reform Commis-
sion (GRC) to be a "vehicle of the principles of good governance in
Liberia."'' 5 The GRC was mandated to review and, as necessary, modify
programs on the promotion of good governance; 86 develop public sector
management reforms;117 "ensure transparency and accountability in gov-
ernance in all government institutions and activities, including acting as
the Public Ombudsman";'88 "ensure subsidiarity in governance through
decentralization";'8 9 ensure all appointments are geographically balanced
and well qualified; '9° help create a private- and public-friendly investor
climate;'9 ' and report to the NTLA on progress made in the practice of
good governance in the state.'92
The Lom6 Agreement called for a "Broad-based Government of Na-
tional Unity," which maintained rather than refashioned the existing
constitution of order and its key actors, simply incorporating RUF lead-
ers into a slightly enlarged cabinet. The government of Sierra Leone
agreed to appoint RUF members to one senior cabinet position, such as
minister of finance, foreign affairs, or justice, and to three other cabinet
posts. It also consented to giving the RUF four deputy minister posi-
tions. 9' This arrangement did not seriously impact the structure of the
body politic, although like the power-sharing under the Accra Agree-
ment, it raised several legal, moral, and legitimacy-based questions.' 94
One rationale for the dichotomy between hard and soft power-
sharing in the Accra and Lom6 agreements is that the government of
Charles Taylor of Liberia, although democratically elected, was consid-
ered despotic, a force for evil, and a destabilizing presence in the
region-a lawfully constituted government that functioned unlawfully.
The government of Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, however, was and
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties, Accra, Ghana, Aug. 18, 2003,
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/ihberia_08182003_an4.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2006).
184. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 27(2).
185. Id. art. 16(1).
186. Id. art. 16(2)(a).
187. Id. art. 16(2)(b).
188. Id. art. 16(2)(c).
189. Id. art. 16(2)(d).
190. Id. art. 16(2)(e).
191. Id. art. 16(2)(f).
192. Id. art. 16(2)(g).
193. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 5.
194. Telephone Interview with James Jonah, Former U.S. Ambassdor to the United Na-
tions (June 5, 2005).
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arguably is widely considered responsible, democratic, and committed to
the development of the state. Kabbah's government also benefited from
having an ECOMOG presence during and after peace negotiations.
Hence, his government debatably had greater legitimacy, security, and
thus negotiating strength with its rebels than Taylor's regime. Further-
more, the LURD and MODEL were widely perceived as having greater
legitimacy than the brutal RUF because they fought a despised regime
headed by a former warlord and did not have a notorious reputation for
malevolence or for brutalizing and butchering civilians.
In spite of this dichotomy, the objective of both accords was to di-
vide or apportion political power among the warring factions, with the
hope of serving the public good by fostering peace, security, and stabil-
ity. Nonetheless, the agreements shared power in dissimilar ways,
triggering different legal implications. As previously noted, the Accra
Agreement went as far as to dismiss "all cabinet Ministers, Deputy and
Assistant Ministers, heads of autonomous agencies, commissions heads
of public corporations and State-owned enterprises of the current" gov-
ernment of Liberia.'9 It also dismissed all members of the Liberian
Legislature and Supreme Court, replacing the former with the NTLA
while empowering the NTGL to appoint new judges.9 6 In essence, the
Accra Agreement purged the entire senior bureaucratic class of govern-
ment. Conversely, the Lom6 Agreement provided for a "broad-based
government of national unity through cabinet appointments" in a "mod-
erately expanded cabinet."' 9' Still, both agreements permitted rebel
groups to transform into political parties and compete for and hold po-
litical office. In this sense and to differing degrees, the accords provided
a legal platform for warlords and their cohorts to acquire political power
through illegal peace.
The phenomenon of power-sharing in Liberia and Sierra Leone oc-
curs not only in the political domain but also in the economic realm. The
next section briefly highlights features of the power-sharing accords with
economic consequences.
3. Economic-related Commissions
The Accra and Lomd agreements established the Contract and Mo-
nopolies Commission (CMC) and the Commission for the Management
of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
(CMRRD), respectively. These commissions are crucial to governance
because strategic natural resources form the backbone of the economies
195. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 21(3).
196. Id. art. 27(2).
197. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, arts. 5(1), 5(3).
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of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Factional vying over these resources fea-
tured prominently in the peace negotiations that produced the accords.
Accra created the CMC to "oversee" the contracting activities of the
NTGL 98 to ensure the government operated in a transparent, non-
monopolistic fashion and dealt with all public financial and budgetary
obligations according to Liberian law and universally accepted norms of
practice. The CMC sought to monitor corruption of public officers and
publish "all tenders in the media and on its own website to ensure ...
competition and transparency"' and "a record of all commercial entities
that participated and succeeded in reviewing contracts.,, 200 The institution
of sound macroeconomic policy that would contribute to sustainable de-
velopment and resource mobilization with international organizations
was also an important duty of the CMC. 20 ' The CMC was composed of
five members, which the transitional chairman appointed and the NTLA
confirmed.2 2
The Lom6 Agreement established the CMRRD as an autonomous
entity to ensure the government exercised full control over the "exploita-
tion of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people
of Sierra Leone.' 203 It charged the CMRRD with securing and monitoring
legitimate utilization of the state's precious resources, which are of "stra-
tegic importance for national security,"2' and gave the entity numerous
duties; foremost among them were security,205 licensing,2 0 contracting,207
public redistribution of all proceeds of all transactions of gold and dia-
monds, 20 ' and public disclosure of all records concerning its
transactions.2°9 Ironically, article 7(12) of the Agreement dictated that
RUF leader Foday Sankoh chair the board that governs the CMRRD.
The CMRRD was composed of nine other members, including two rep-
resentatives of government, two from the political party apparatus of the
RUF, three representatives of civil society, and two from other political
198. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 17(1).
199. Id. art. 17(2)(b)(c).
200. Id. art. 17(2)(c).
201. Id. art. 17(2)(d)(e).
202. Id. art. 17(3)(a).
203. See Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 7(1). The Lomd Agreement seemed to
implement a policy of quasi-nationalization, given that it forbade the sale and export of gold
and diamonds unless it was sanctioned by the commission and rendered null and void all ex-
isting concessions. Id. art. 7(2).
204. Id. art. 7(1).
205. Id. art. 7(4).
206. Id. art. 7(3).
207. Id. art. 7(5).
208. ld. art. 7(6).
209. Id. art. 7(10).
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parties appointed by the Sierra Leonean parliament." ° What is perhaps
most surprising about the Agreement's approach to managing natural
resources was the willingness of the government and RUF to support an
"amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and
diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone.
' 211
4. Conclusion
Thus, the power-sharing provisions in the Accra and Lom6 accords
related to governance, the economy, and other sectors provided for cen-
tralized control over the legislature, judiciary, public contracting, and
strategic resources. The extent to which the human-rights orientated pro-
visons were implemented (e.g., Lom6's special victims fund) remains
unclear. The attempt to use the agreements to rebuild the states' respec-
tive political systems and control strategic resources to create peace and
maximize revenues for development is laudable; in doing so, however,
the accords rewarded warlords and their pundits by placing them in key
positions of authority over their victims. These types of arrangements are
arguably careless and dangerous; thus, the next Part examines the legal-
ity of power-sharing exchanges euphemistically labeled "guns for jobs."
VI. THE LEGALITY OF POWER-SHARING UNDER
THE ACCRA AND LOMt AccoRDS
The preambles of the Accra and Lom6 agreements include all of the
bells-and-whistles language of democracy. They make the "people" the
subject of their concern, along with the accompanying mixed basket of
peace, security, stability, human rights, justice, rule of law, development,
democracy, and good governance."2 An examination of the power-
sharing provisions that underlie the preambles, however, raises critical
questions about their sincerity, morality, and legality."3 The stark dichot-
omy between the luminous preambles and the ominous articles is
practically schizophrenic.
210. Id. art. 7(12).
211. Id. art. 7(14). According to the Agreement, profits from gold, diamonds, and other
natural resources are should be used for the educational, health, and infrastructural develop-
ment of Sierra Leoneans and the "compensation of incapacitated war victims." Id.
212. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, preamble; Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38,
preamble.
213. The following analysis is concerned with the legal as opposed to moral questions
raised by power-sharing; since moral dimensions are not necessarily separable from legal
ones, however, particularly on the issue of fundamental human rights, moral considerations
will inevitably be addessed.
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The most effective way to assess the legality of the power-sharing
provisions in the Accra and Lomd accords is to measure them against the
constitutional frameworks that supposedly govern and control what the
Liberian and Sierra Leonean governments can and cannot do. These
rules include, first, government powers as determined by domestic laws,
including organic constitutions, domestic peace agreements, national
legislation, and court rulings,2 4 and, second, international or transna-
tional rules such as treaties, protocols, conventions, and general
international law. 25 The analysis that follows examines the extent to
which the Accra and Lom6 agreements comported with such rules, em-
ploying a textualist interpretive approach with a dose of original intent
doctrine. For primary sources, it relies upon domestic constitutions, do-
mestic peace agreements, multilateral constitutive acts and other
international treaties, UN resolutions, and official reports and general
comments from international bodies; the analysis also gives appropriate
attention to supplemental sources such as scholarly writings and elec-
tronic and print news media sources.
A. Domestic Law
Since the constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone are applicable to
the Accra and Lom6 accords, respectively, and are similar in structure
and content, the analysis that follows is divided into four sections: state
authority, fundamental rights, executive and legislature, and judiciary.
This section employs a literalist approach more rigidly than in Parts V.B
and V.C, as constitutional jurisprudence on the central issues underlying
political power-sharing are, to the author's knowledge, virtually non-
existent in these states.2 6 Moreover, it is not clear that any such jurispru-
dence would be applicable to modern civil war in Liberia and Sierra
Leone; the political culture in both states dictate that on questions of ex-
ecutive authority the judicial branch serves as a proxy for, as opposed to
an independent arbiter of, executive prerogatives. Political culture super-
sedes jurisprudence and the rule of law depending on who is in power.
For example, U.S. courts have found that, as a matter of law, Liberia's
214. The analysis that follows concentrates primarily on the constitutions of Liberia and
Sierra Leone and other rules where relevant. Part of the reason for this approach is the irrele-
vance of national legislation and court rulings unrelated to the accords.
215. For analytic purposes, the international rules are divided into two categories: (1)
regional and subregional law and (2) international law. Category (1) forms an important part
of category (2).
216. The extent to which, if any, the constitutional jurisprudence of Liberia and Sierra
Leone accords the executive branch powers to make "extraconstitutional rules" during times
of civil war remains largely unexplored and is in need of research. The author is not familiar
with any judicial doctrine in Liberia or Sierra Leone that endows the executive branch with
such powers.
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courts were unfair, in a state of disarray, and not constitutive of "a sys-
tem of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice," particularly during the civil war."'
The Accra and Lom6 accords violated no less than 30 provisions in
the Liberian and Sierra Leone constitutions. The hard power-sharing
provided for in the Accra Agreement is significantly more violative of
domestic, regional, and international law than the soft power-sharing in
the Lom6 Agreement. Nonetheless, they are both in serious breach of
superior or controlling domestic rules.
The 1986 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia contains 8 chapters
and 97 articles and replaces the Liberian Constitution of 1847.211
8 It is
modeled on the Constitution of the United States. The 1991 Constitution
of Sierra Leone contains 14 chapters and 191 articles and replaces the
1978 Constitution of Sierra Leone.2"9 It is modeled on the common law
of the United Kingdom.
1. State Authority
The constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone are by their own terms
intended to establish a framework of good governance that guarantees
security, freedom, democracy, and justice. The preamble of the Liberian
Constitution establishes a system of government "for the purpose of
promoting unity, peace, stability, equality, justice and human rights un-
der the law."22 According to the Sierra Leone Constitution, the state is
based on the "principles of Freedom, Democracy and Justice,
' 2 ' and the
"security, peace, and welfare of the people of Sierra Leone shall be the
primary purpose and responsibility of Government." '222
The constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone are superior and con-
trolling over any other laws, including the Accra and Lom6 accords.
Article 2 of the Liberian Constitution states that "[t]his Constitution is
the supreme and fundamental law of Liberia and its provisions shall
have binding force and effect on all authorities and persons throughout
the Republic. 223 The Sierra Leone Constitution similarly declares that
"sovereignty belongs to the people of Sierra Leone from whom Govern-
ment through this Constitution derives all its powers, authority and
217. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bridgeway
Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
218. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, preamble.
219. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, preamble.
220. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, preamble (emphasis added).
221. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 5(1).
222. Id. art. 5(2)(b).
223. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 2 (emphasis added).
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legitimacy.' 24 According to both constitutions, they may only be modi-
fied, amended, or suspended by following the expressed provisions and
procedures enshrined within them.2 5 They sit atop the hierarchy of do-
mestic law and trump and control any and all conflicting rules, including
"extra-Constitutional" peace arrangements. Article 2 of the Liberian
Constitution states that "[a]ny laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs
and regulations found to be inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect."226 In similar fashion, the
Sierra Leone Constitution provides that it "shall be the supreme law of
Sierra Leone and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provi-
sion of [the] Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void
and of no effect."227 From this background, it is abundantly clear that as
"legally binding" agreements that purport to form a part of national law,
the Accra and Lom6 accords must comport with and not violate the con-
stitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. To argue otherwise is
to argue into nothingness-a black hole of unsubstantiated authority
where the rule of law looms fictitiously.
Despite the fact that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean constitutions
are supreme law and superior to any other domestic rules, the Accra and
Lom6 agreements egregiously contravened them. For example, as noted
earlier, the Accra Agreement called for an "extra-Constitutional ar-
rangement" that included the suspension of the Liberian Constitution,
statutes, and all other Liberian laws that concern government, declaring
that any Liberian law, including the constitution, that conflicts with the
Agreement is annulled.28 Furthermore, the Lom6 Agreement required
the government of Sierra Leone to "remove any legal impediments that
may prevent the RUF/SL from holding cabinet and other positions"; 229
"take administrative actions to implement the commitments" in the
Agreement and "in the case of enabling legislation ... draft and submit
to Parliament within thirty days" of the coming into force of the Agree-
ment the "relevant bills for their enactment into law"; 230 execute the
"appropriate legal steps" to grant "absolute and free pardon" to Foday
Sankoh and all combatants and collaborators for any action in pursuit of
their objectives; 23' and ensure that "no constitutional or any other legal
224. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 5(2)(a) (emphasis added).
225. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 2; CONSTITUTION OF SI-
ERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 171(15).
226. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 2 (emphasis added).
227. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 171(15) (emphasis added).
228. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 35.
229. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 5(5).
230. Id. art. 7(13).
231. Id. art. 9(1).
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provision prevents the implementation" of the Agreement. 2 2 The Lom6
Agreement also established a Constitutional Review Committee to re-
view the constitution and, "where deemed appropriate, recommend
revisions and amendments in accordance with... the Constitution."
233
Thus, the extent to which the political elites and institutions who ne-
gotiated, sanctioned, and "morally guaranteed" the Accra and Lom6
accords sought to circumvent domestic law, albeit unwittingly and
unlawfully, serves as the best evidence of their recognition of its superior
standing.
2. Fundamental Rights
The Liberian Constitution requires the government of the republic, at
the most fundamental element of state governance, to strengthen and
unify the people of Liberia into one body politic and enact laws that
promote and encourage all Liberians to participate in government.
2
"'
Moreover, the government is obligated to "preserve, protect and promote
positive Liberian culture," '235 including a democratic political culture that
encompasses traditional values, with a view to creating a viable civic
culture. The Sierra Leone Constitution declares that as a fundamental
principle of state policy, "the participation of the people in the govern-
ance of the State shall be ensured in accordance with the provisions of
[its] Constitution., 23 6 Hence, a core tenet of both constitutions is govern-
ment by the people and for the people.
The Liberian and Sierra Leone constitutions protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the individual, including, among others, the right
to life, liberty, security of the person, enjoyment of property, privilege,
the right to vote, and equal protection before the law of all persons.
2 37
The Liberian Constitution also guarantees the public the right to "be in-
formed about the government and its functionaries." 8 The Sierra Leone
Constitution requires the state to "enforce the rule of law and ensure the
efficient functioning of Government services."239 The Accra and Lom6
agreements, however, prevented Liberians and Sierra Leoneans from
participating in the negotiations that produced the accords-agreements
232. Id. art. 10.
233. Id. art. 10.
234. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 5(a).
235. Id. art. 5(b).
236. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 5(c).
237. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, arts. 20(a), 1 (b), 11(c) (em-
phasis added); CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 6(4), 15(a-d).
238. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 15(c).
239. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 6(4).
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that altered the constitution of order and rule of law in contravention of
their constitutional rights.
The Liberian Constitution guarantees that if any person or associa-
tion believes any of their rights guaranteed under the "Constitution or
any legislation or directives are constitutionally contravened [by the gov-
ernment], that person or association may invoke the privilege and benefit
of court direction, order of writ, including a judgment of unconstitution-
ality."2' ° Similarly, the Sierra Leone Constitution permits any person who
believes his or her fundamental human rights or individual rights have
been violated by the government to bring a claim directly before the Su-
preme Court for redress.24' Moreover, the Liberian and Sierra Leone
constitutions explicitly state and implicitly provide, respectively, that any
person who is "injured by an act of Government or any person acting
under its authority, whether in property, contract, tort or otherwise, shall
have the right to bring suit for appropriate redress.
242
The power-sharing provisions in the Accra and Lom6 agreements
violated the most fundamental principles of state policy enshrined in the
constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone-namely, those granting peo-
ple the right to participate in government and foster a democratic
political culture. The processes that produced the accords were not de-
mocratic or transparent; there were no national referendums or other
processes in which people could casts votes or otherwise select their
leaders. There were only private negotiations by warlords, political elites
in and from governments and international organizations, and nonprofit
institutions; the masses of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans were not in-
vited to participate in the peace negotiations. Consequently, Liberians
and Sierra Leoneans had their political systems overhauled by legally
dubious processes that ultimately forced them to live under the rule of
warlords. Again, the modus operandi that produced the Accra and Lom6
agreements did not provide Liberians and Sierra Leoneans with the op-
portunity to realize their most fundamental political right: the right to
self-determination (i.e., the right to choose the forms of government un-
der which they will live and the persons who will represent them). 3 In
addition, the accords violated the constitutional rights of Liberians and
Sierra Leoneans to be informed about the workings of government, "
240. Any claims brought against the government would originate in the Claims Court
and on appeal would go to the Supreme Court. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA,
1986, art. 26.
241. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 28.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. 31.
244. It is important to reemphasize the point that the Accra and Lomd accords were
negotiated outside of Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively, and hence prevented Liberians
and Sierra Leoneans from being informed about or participating in the affairs of government.
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which is particularly troubling given that their governments contracted
away this right in the "public good."24
Another problematic aspect of the Accra and Lom6 accords was
their failure to, in accordance with the constitutions of Liberia and Sierra
Leone, provide any mechanism for considering or adjudicating individ-
ual criminal and civil claims arising out of the civil wars or challenging
the constitutionality of the accords and their infringement of fundamen-
tal rights.246 Both agreements did, however, make provision for rather
toothless truth and reconciliation commissions to provide a venue for
victims and perpetrators to "share their experiences" or "tell their story"
regarding issues of impunity and human rights violations; this would
allow, according to the accords, "a clear picture of the past to facilitate
genuine healing and reconciliation. 247
Finally, the constitutional and criminal laws of Liberia and Sierra
Leone are unmistakably clear about the necessity for individual criminal
liability for heinous crimes such as murder, treason, and crimes against
the state, as well as the limited powers of the president to pardon such
crimes.248 Yet the Accra and Lom6 accords did not consider the issue of
criminal liability outside the context of amnestyY9 It is not necessary to
recount the innumerable atrocities the warring factions committed in the
Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars; governments, international or-
ganizations, and civil society groups have extensively documented the
crimes.20 It is important, however, to highlight how power-sharing with
warlords and rebels responsible for committing atrocities contravenes
domestic rules.5
245. Such behavior would appear to give Sierra Leoneans a basis upon which to bring an
action against the government. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 127(1).
246. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 26.; CONSTITUTION OF
SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 28. In the wake of the failure of the Lomd Agreement to make vi-
able peace, the government of Sierra Leone and the UN jointly created the Special Court for
Sierra Leone "to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since 30 November 1996." About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-
sl.org/about.html (last visited July 25, 2005).
247. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 8; Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 25(1).
248. The term heinous crimes refers to crimes against the state and the individual that
are capital offenses.
249. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 34; Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 9.
250. For example, see Human Rights Watch: Africa, http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=africa
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006); Amnesty International: Africa, http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-
2af/news (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); International Crisis Group: Africa,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1098&1l= (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); United
States Department of State: Country Reports, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/cl470.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006).
251. This Article will not address the legality of national amnesties under international
law. For more on this issue, see BEN CHIGARA, AMNESTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGALITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF NATIONAL AMNESTY LAWS (2002).
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Like most state constitutive instruments, the constitutions of Liberia
and Sierra Leone do not include detailed penal law.2 The relevant and
authoritative penal rules of Liberia and Sierra Leone are found in the
"Act Adopting a New Penal Law and Repealing Sections 31.3 & 32.1 of
the Criminal Procedure Law" and the "Treason and State Offences Act,
1963," respectively.2 53 These rules, as well as international humanitarian
law, were binding on all of the combatants during the civil wars in Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone.
Setting aside the horrific crimes the warring factions committed
against individuals during the civil wars, the various categories of crimes
they committed against the state (including treason, making war against
the state, armed insurrection, advocating armed insurrection, paramili-
tary activities, sabotage, and espionage) are also daunting. Yet the Lom6
Agreement awarded amnesty to all warring factions, and the Liberian
government is considering doing the same-of course, given that it has
shared power with the LURD, MODEL, and other groups, it has already
granted a de facto amnesty. Nevertheless, the constitutional or criminal
laws of Liberia and Sierra Leone do not explicitly empower the execu-
tive or legislative branches of government to award amnesty, especially
for crimes of an international character that necessitate investigation,
prosecution, and punishment (e.g., war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture)--crimes that do not form a part of domestic penal
law. Under what authority can a government award amnesty for crimes
that do not form part of its domestic penal law? Moreover, as defined in
the constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the executive pardon may
apply only once individuals are prosecuted and convicted of crimes.254
The awarding of amnesty in advance of any prosecutions or convictions,
252. Interestingly, article 76 of the Liberian Constitution does, however, make provision
for the crime of treason, which is typically classified as a crime against the state. The constitu-
tion defines treason as:
(1) levying war against the Republic; (2) aligning oneself with or aiding and abet-
ting another nation or people with whom Liberia is at war or in a state of war; (3)
acts of espionage for an enemy state; (4) attempting by overt act to overthrow the
Government, rebellion against the Republic, insurrection and mutiny; and (5) abro-
gating or attempting to abrogate, subverting or attempting or conspiring to subvert
the Constitution by use of force or show of force or any other means which attempts
to undermine [the] Constitution.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 76.
253. Act Adopting a New Penal Law and Repealing Sections 31.3 & 32.1 of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law, July 19, 1976 (Liber.); Treason and State Offences Act 1963, Act No. 10
of 1963 (Sierra Leone).
254. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 59; CONSTITUTION OF
SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 63(1).
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again, exceeds the powers enumerated in the constitutions of Liberia and
Sierra Leone and is thus unconstitutional.
The following section discusses these and other issues concerning
the legality of the executive and legislature-related power-sharing provi-
sions of the Accra and Lom6 agreements.
3. Executive and Legislative Powers
The constitutions of Liberia and Sierra Leone confer on the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of government immense but
limited powers. The constitutional provisions relating to power-sharing
concern, among other functions, the presidential powers to appoint cabi-
net ministers, ambassadors, justices, and military and police officials,
conduct foreign affairs, and grant reprieves and pardons; 5  legislative
powers to give advice and consent to presidential appointments and
make laws for the execution of government; and judicial authority to
serve as the final arbiter on constitutional issues.
The "hard" power-sharing provisions in the Accra Agreement that
sought to create the NTGL through extra-constitutional means usurped
in every respect the executive, legislative, and judicial powers enumer-
ated in the Liberian Constitution. 56 Although the constitution empowers
the Liberian president in the conduct of "foreign affairs" to "conclude
treaties, conventions and similar international agreements with the con-
currence of a majority of each of the House and Legislature,"' 7 the Accra
Agreement is domestic in nature. This remains true irrespective of the
international status of the Agreement's moral guarantors. Moreover,
Moses Blah, Taylor's presidential successor, did not have the legal au-
thority to enter into any agreement that would contravene Liberia's entire
constitutional framework by disbanding and reconstituting in whole or
part the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.2
9
Any refashioning of Liberia's political order, particularly within the
255. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, arts. 54-59; CONSTITU-
TION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, arts. 40, 53-70.
256. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, arts. 24-27, 35. There do not, however, ap-
pear to be any constitutional limitations on the power of the president to establish the
commissions.
257. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 57.
258. An important question, however, remains unresolved by this approach: can a rebel
group that has significant outside military support and consequently acquires de facto control
of the state or unquestionable military superiority on the battlefield prior to peace negotiations
be considered to have acquired sufficient legal personality to classify the conflict as interstate
in character and hence the agreement as a bonafide treaty?
259. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, arts. 21-27. One interesting observation here
is that while the constitutionally-mandated line of presidential succession was followed, after
Taylor's resignation, all of the constitutional prohibitions against power-sharing were patently
ignored.
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context of civil conflict, requires sanctioning from the Legislature, which
is empowered to "provide for the security of the Republic" and "make
other laws" for the execution of all powers vested by the constitution in
the government of the republic.2'6 No such legislation was adopted.
As described above, the Liberian Constitution vests all judicial
power in the Supreme Court, and its judgments are considered "final and
binding and ... not ... the subject of appeal or review by any other
branch of Government." 26' Furthermore, the Liberian Legislature cannot
make any law or create any exceptions that would deprive the Supreme
Court of any of its powers.262 In addition, the justices of the Supreme
Court and subordinate courts remain on the bench indefinitely and may
be removed from office only "upon impeachment and conviction by the
Legislature based on proved misconduct, gross breach of duty, inability
to perform the functions of their office, or conviction in a court of law
for treason, bribery or other infamous crimes .,263 Nevertheless, the Accra
Agreement terminated the Supreme Court, a more than suspicious action
given that the court is the only body with the authority to entertain a
claim against the government concerning the constitutionality of the
Agreement. Additionally, the constitution states that the president must
appoint justices of the Supreme Court with the consent of the Senate, yet
under the Accra Agreement, "all new judicial appointments shall be
made by the Chairman of the NTGL and approved by the NTLA. 26" In
this regard, the NTGL and the NTLA unlawfully usurped powers re-
served by the constitution for a lawfully constituted government elected
by the people, transferring them to an appointed transitional arrangement
birthed through an ad hoc negotiation.
Finally, the Accra Agreement's establishment of a new executive
(NTGL) composed of the warring factions violated the process and pro-
cedure for senior government appointees in the Liberian Constitution.
According to the constitution, the president nominates and, "with the
consent of the Senate," appoints cabinet-level and other senior govern-
ment positions .2 65  The Agreement wholly disregarded this
constitutionally mandated process by simply dividing the executive
branch among a combination of warlords, businesspersons, and political
elites representing various constituencies, including Taylor's govern-
ment. There is also a question of whether the formation of the NTGL
created a unique type of one-party state, given that its proponents were
260. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 34.
261. Id. art. 65.
262. Id. art. 66.
263. Id. art. 71.
264. Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 27(3).
265. Id. arts. 24-27, 35
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political elites from the warring factions and that it rejected democratic
means of forming government and the tripartite system prescribed in the
constitution. Thus, the formation of the NTGL arguably offended article
77 of the Liberian Constitution, which states that "laws, regulations de-
crees or measures which might have the effect of creating a one-party
state [e.g., NTGL] shall be declared unconstitutional. '26 The Accra
Agreement also blatantly offended the spirit and substance of domestic
Liberian law, especially the constitutional principle that the "essence of
democracy is free competition. 267
In addition, the Agreement's formation of the NTLA to "replace,
within the transitional period, the entire Legislature of the Republic" is
legally absurd, considering that the 76-member body was not elected by
the Liberian people in accordance with the constitution 26--thereby sub-
verting the people's constitutional right to participate in government and
select their own political representatives.
269
The Lom6 Agreement's soft power-sharing is seemingly less offen-
sive to domestic law in Sierra Leone than the Accra Agreement's hard
power-sharing is to Liberian law, as Lom6 does not require the complete
overhaul of the state's political apparatus but merely power-sharing
within the executive branch of government.270
The Sierra Leone Constitution mandates that the "President is the
guardian of the Constitution and guarantor of national independence
' 27'
and is responsible for "all constitutional matters concerning legislation"
and "the execution of treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of
Sierra Leone. 27 Although most common law systems typically limit
presidential powers to conclude agreements to the realm of foreign af-
fairs, the Sierra Leone Constitution seems to give the president broader
treaty-making powers and the authority to conclude domestic agree-
ments with rebels who have captured the state.273 Due to the quasi-
international nature of the Sierra Leone Civil War, coupled with the
Lom6 Agreement's limited power-sharing provisions, the president's
authority to enter into the Agreement was debatably lawful.274 This does
266. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 77.
267. Id. art. 77.
268. See Accra Agreement, supra note 110, art. 24.
269. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, arts. 45, 48.
270. Notwithstanding, the Accra Agreement does not appear to limit the power of the
president to set up commissions.
271. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 40 (3).
272. Id. arts. 40(4)(a),(d).
273. See id. art. 40. See also, Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Inter-
vention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1985).
274. Quasi-international in this context refers to the international dimensions of the war
(e.g., Charles Taylor's support of the RUF) as well as the illicit involvement of foreign mining
and lumber corporations.
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not, however, mean that Kabbah had the authority to share power or
grant amnesty, nor does it signal that Lom6's provisions on power-
sharing and amnesty were lawful. The constitution requires that "any"
treaty, agreement, or convention that relates to "any matter within the
legislative competence of Parliament or that in any way alters the law of
Sierra Leone" be subject to ratification through an enactment or support-
ing resolution of the parliament .1 5 As the discussion in the preceding
sections demonstrate, and as the following discussion will show, the
Lom6 Agreement did indeed modify the law of Sierra Leone. After its
entry into force, the president and the parliament speedily introduced
legislation to ratify the Agreement in order to legitimize the "alteration
of the law of Sierra Leone" and give maximum effect to the accord."6
The legal problems with this approach are examined below.
The appointment of Foday Sankoh as vice president and other RUF
warlords to senior-level government positions raises further legal and
moral questions. The law-related questions are both substantive and pro-
cedural and concern the way in which the Kabbah government shared
power with the RUE The moral questions concern the notion of sharing
power with warlords and rebels who committed and directed atrocities.277
The Sierra Leone Constitution confers on the president executive
powers to appoint ministers, deputy ministers, and other senior-level
public officers; the constitution, however, contains substantive limita-
tions to these powers that bear directly on the Lom6 Agreement. The
Agreement literally appointed Sankoh vice president and made him "an-
swerable only to the President of Sierra Leone,, 278 without considering
that, to qualify as vice president according to the constitution, "a person
shall be designated a candidate for the office of Vice-President by a
Presidential candidate before a Presidential election.279 Moreover, under
the constitution, no persons are to be considered as candidates for vice
president unless they meet certain qualifications-namely, they must be
citizens of Sierra Leone, members of a political party, at least 40 years of
age, and qualified to be elected as a member of Parliament.2 80 At the time
of his appointment, Sankoh was not a member of any political party; it is
also questionable whether he met two of the four criteria for membership
in the parliament, as he was not "an elector whose name [was] on a reg-
ister of electors under the Franchise and Electoral Registration Act,
275. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 4.
276. Lomd Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act, July 15, 1999.
277. The moral dimension is discussed in the regional and international law sections of
the Article.
278. Lomd Agreement, supra note 38, art. 5(2).
279. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 54(2)(a). (emphasis added).
280. Id. arts. 41(a-d).
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1961, or any Act of Parliament amending or replacing that Act. '28' It is
also not clear whether he was "able to speak and to read the English
Language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to enable him to take an
active part in the proceedings of Parliament. 2 2 Furthermore, the consti-
tution states that no person is qualified to be a member of Parliament if
"under any law in force in Sierra Leone he is adjudged to be a lunatic or
otherwise declared to be of unsound mind., 283 Given the brutal scourge
of ritualistic killing, rape, torture, and cannibalism that Sankoh directed
and participated in, one can only surmise that, given the opportunity, any
competent authority would have adjudged him to be a lunatic. For these
reasons, the power-sharing provisions in the Lom6 Agreement appeared
to be unlawful, as was the government's appointment of Sankoh as vice
president.
The logic employed in this analysis is equally applicable to all of the
senior and junior cabinet-level positions the Agreement awarded to the
RUF.2 4 Although the constitution does not require parliamentary ap-
proval for vice presidential appointments, it does require that "all"
minister and deputy minister appointments be "approved by Parlia-
ment."285 While the Sierra Leone Parliament adopted the Lom6 Peace
Agreement (Ratification) Act (Lom6 Act) ex post facto,286 which sancti-
fied the entire Agreement as law, it could not lawfully approve or
authorize ministerial appointments because Kabbah did not formally
select the appointees until after the adoption of the Agreement. More-
over, the Sierra Leone Constitution requires that separate parliamentary
approval is necessary for each "person" appointed; 21 7 hence, the Agree-
ment's attempt at a one-for-all christening unlawfully abrogated the
constitution.
Finally, the legality of the Lom6 Act is also in question. First, the Act
does not amend, repeal, or alter the provisions of the constitution in ex-
press terms, as article 108 of the constitution requires, 2  let alone
provide any guidance on how to resolve numerous hierarchical conflicts
of law arising from the existence of the Lom6 Agreement as a "superior"
281. See id. arts. 75(b), 75(d).
282. Id.
283. Id. art. 76(1)(c) (emphasis added).
284. See Lom6 Agreement, supra note 38, art. 5(3).
285. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 56(2)(c).
286. This means that the Lomd Agreement was adopted before it was "authorized" by
Parliament, in violation of article 108(8), which states that "any suspension, alteration, or
repeal of this Constitution other than on the authority of Parliament shall be deemed to be an
act of Treason." Id. art. 108(8).
287. Id.
288. Article 108(7) states that "[n]o Act of Parliament shall be deemed to amend, add to
or repeal in any way alter any of the provisions of the Constitution unless it does so in express
terms." See id. art. 108(7).
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body of law to the constitution. Second, despite the fact that Parliament
can modify the Sierra Leone Constitution, any bill or act seeking to alter
certain provisions of the constitution
289
shall not be submitted to the President for his assent and shall
not become law unless the Bill, after it has been passed by Par-
liament and in the form in which it was so passed, has, in
accordance with the provisions of any law in that behalf, been
submitted to and been approved at a referendum.29
The Lom6 Act was not approved through a referendum; thus it be-
came law unlawfully. Moreover, the Act offends certain fundamental
human rights enshrined in chapter III (provisions 16-39) of the constitu-
tion and directly conflicts with its section 56.291 The Act violated the
fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individuals whom the
constitution seeks to protect by politically empowering and granting am-
nesty. For example, the Act sanctioned the provisions in the Lom6
Agreement that stifled the rights of Sierra Leoneans to "participate in
and defend all democratic processes and practices" by placing RUF offi-
cials in sensitive government positions in contravention of the
constitution.292 Furthermore, the Act provided the cover of state authority
to persons who participated in the violation of nearly every human right
enshrined in the constitution, including, among others, the right to life,
liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and protection
of law,293 the right not be "held in slavery" (which encompasses child
soldiers and sexual slaves), and the right to be free from torture.29 4 It also
infringed the constitution by curtailing the rights of victims of the Sierra
Leone Civil War to challenge the legality of the Lom6 Agreement and its
ratifying Act, seek penal justice, and pursue civil remedies, in contraven-
tion of provision 28 of the constitution, which states:
[I]f any person alleges that any of the provisions of section 16-
27 (inclusive) has been, is being contravened in relation to him
by any person ... then without prejudice to any other action
with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that
289. These provisions include all of Chapter III of the Sierra Leone Constitution, titled,
"The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individ-
ual" and sections 46, 56, 72, 73, 74(2), 74(3), 84(2), 85, 87, 105, 110-119, 120, 121-124, 128,
129, 131-133, 135, 136, 137, 140, 151, 156, and 167.
290. Id. art. 108(3).
291. Article 56 requires that no person shall be appointed a minister or deputy minister if
she is "not qualified to be elected as a Member of Parliament" and her "nomination is [not]
approved by Parliament." Id. art. 56.
292. See id. art. 13(i).
293. See id. art. 15,16.
294. See id. arts. 19, 20.
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person, (or that other person), may apply by motion to the Su-
291preme Court for redress.
In addition, the Lom6 Agreement and Lom6 Act abrogated the rights
of Sierra Leoneans to make a claim against the government in accor-
dance with section 133 of the constitution, which provides that "[w]here
a person has a claim against the Government, that claim may be enforced
as of right by proceedings taken against the Government for that pur-
pose" and that Parliament shall ensure the "provision for the exercise of
,,196jurisdiction under this section. In this respect, the Agreement and Act
unlawfully shielded government and those persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for the Sierra Leone Civil War from accountability and
any form of legal sanction.
Finally, furthermore, according to article 106 of the constitution, "a
Bill shall not become law unless it has been duly passed and signed in
accordance with [the] Constitution"297-which did not occur with respect
to the Lom6 Agreement. As the preceding analysis shows, since the gov-
ernment and Parliament exceeded their powers by violating domestic
law and failing to follow the constitutionally mandated procedures for
entering into the Lom6 Agreement and adopting the Act, they acted ille-
gally.
The only possible legal measure that could provide some semblance
of validity to the Accra and Lom6 accords would be the explicit invoca-
tion of public emergency powers under the Liberian and Sierra Leonean
constitutions. Neither the accords nor related dicta, however, indicate the
two governments relied on emergency powers as a basis to enter into the
agreements; furthermore, under international law, states "must act within
their constitutional and other provisions of law that govern such procla-
mation and the exercise of emergency powers."'298 Hence, the accords
would still have been unlawful even if governments had relied on emer-
gency powers, given that under sections 87 and 29 of the Liberian and
Sierra Leonean constitutions, respectively, emergency powers do not
include the power to suspend, modify, or abrogate constitutions. 299
295. See id. art. 21.
296. See id. art. 133.
297. Id. arts. 106(1), 106(2).
298. UN Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4),
4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.I 1 (Aug. 31, 2001).
299. According to article 87, the "emergency powers do not include the power to sus-
pend or abrogate the Constitution, dissolve the Legislature, or suspend or dismiss the
Judiciary; and no constitutional amendments shall be promulgated during a state of emer-
gency." CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, 1986, art. 58. Section 29 of the Sierra
Leone Constitution extends vast authority to the president to "amend any law, suspend the
operation of any law, and apply any law with or without modification" during public emergen-
cies to secure peace, order, and good government, as long as any such "amendment,
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4. Conclusion
From this background, it is clear the Accra and Lom6 agreements are
and were unlawfully derived and illegally instituted. Considering there
was no legal authority under domestic law that sanctioned the accords'
entry into force, how can domestic and international decisionmakers jus-
tify their existence? This raises the question, discussed more thoroughly
in the Article's conclusion, of whether any legal or political remedies exist
under the Lom6 and Accra accords to redress the consequences of "illegal
peace.' '300 For now, the Article turns to the legality of the Accra and Lom6
accords under regional and subregional treaty law and practice.
B. Regional and Subregional Law
Liberia and Sierra Leone are member states of both the AU, °1 Af-
rica's foremost political organization, which is composed of all African
states with the exception of Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar, and
ECOWAS, a subregional organization composed of fifteen West African
states. 32 As founding members of the AU and ECOWAS, Liberia and
Sierra Leone signed, ratified, and thereby consented to be bound by their
respective treaties, regulations, practice, and policy, which form an inte-
gral part of the wider corpus of international law.
The power-sharing provisions in the Accra and Lom6 accords contra-
vende the human rights and democracy and governance-related aims,
treaty law, regional custom, and institutional practice of the AU and
ECOWAS. For example, power-sharing offends the well-defined law, doc-
trine, and practice of averting mass human rights violations and protecting,
through the use of force if necessary, democratically constituted regimes
against unlawful seizures of power.3"3 This section examines the legality of
suspension or modification shall not apply to the Constitution." CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA
LEONE, 1991, art. 29(5)(d). If, during a public emergency, the presidents of Liberia and Sierra
Leone lack the aforementioned authority, how can the power-sharing provisions in the agree-
ments be considered lawful, even under the most liberal interpretation of presidential powers
under the constitutions?
300. For example, under article 28 of the Sierra Leone Constitution, if any person alleges
that his or her fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual have been violated,
he or she may apply by motion to the Supreme Court for redress; the amnesty provision in the
Lomd Agreement, however, stifles this right. Hence, both the government and Parliament
created laws that interfere with the protective provisions in the constitution. See CONSTITU-
TION OF SIERRA LEONE, 1991, art. 28(1).
301. African Union Home Page, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index/index.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2006)
302. Economic Community of West African States Home Page, http://www.ecowas.int/
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
303. See generally Jeremy I. Levitt, The African Union Peace and Security Council,
United Nations Security Council and the Use of Force: Tire Case of Darfur Sudan, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE (Neils Blokker & Nico Schri-
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the Accra and Lom6 accords under AU and ECOWAS laws (see Table 1)
because they, along with universal international law, form the foundational




Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (May 1963)
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights (June 1981)
Grand Bay Mauritius Declaration and Plan of Action of the Organization of African Unity
(Grand Bay Declaration) (April 1999)
Draft Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development
and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) (May 1991)
Constitutive Act of the African Union (June 2000)
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (October 2001)
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union (AUPSC Protocol) (July 2002)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (July 1993)
Protocol Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (December 1999) (ECOWAS Conflict Protocol)
Framework Establishing the Economic Community of West African States Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (October 1998)
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-Keeping and
Security (December 2001) (ECOWAS Democracy Protocol)
In contrast to the vital role the AU and ECOWAS have played in ne-
gotiating and keeping peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, their
jver eds., 2005); Jeremy I. Levitt, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa-
Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons:
The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 39 (2001);
Jeremy I. Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, in AFRICAN INTERVEN-
TIONIST STATES (Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001); Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian
Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333 (1998); Jeremy I. Levitt, The Peace and Secu-
rity Council of the African Union, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMP. LEGAL PROBS. 109 (2003).
304. The human rights-related customary regional law of the AU and ECOWAS has been
codified into nearly all of the statutes in Table I and is derived from state practice in the Afri-
can region, UN law (e.g., the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
Genocide Convention, the Torture Convention, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights) and customary international law. Africa's new democracy and governance
norms have also been codified into treaty law (e.g., pro-democratic intervention provision in
article 25 of the ECOWAS Conflict Protocol) and are derived, for the most part, from state
practice since the end of the Cold War.
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willingness to support power-sharing schemes that coerce lawfully-
constituted governments into sharing power with warlords and rebels
who committed human atrocities contravenes their law, guiding princi-
ples, and "purported" practices. Consequently, the actual practice of the
AU and ECOWAS is a mixed bag ranging from hearty adherence to and
enforcement of prodemocratic and human rights-related treaty norms
and custom (e.g., their protection of democracy in Guinea-Bissau, Mau-
ritania, Sdo Tom6 Prfncipe, and Togo) °5 to the bold abrogation of regional
and international human rights law and democratic principles out of politi-
cal necessity and expediency (e.g., their granting of amnesty and power-
sharing for the perceived public good in Liberia and Sierra Leone).
One possible explanation for this dichotomous practice might invoke
the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which in extraordinary circumstances
can provide a lawful basis for states to terminate or suspend a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), states can
breach a treaty if there is a "fundamental change of circumstances which
has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion
of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties," where "the effect
of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty."3" 6 The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone
certainly caused unforeseen changes of circumstances that radically
transformed the ability of the Taylor and Kabbah governments to main-
tain peace and security and protect the human rights and democracy
entitlements of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans under regional and uni-
versal international law. The VCLT, which seems to permit the
temporary derogation of international responsibilities when there is an
"outbreak of hostilities between states, 30 7 may arguably also apply in the
context of intrastate war-perhaps providing another justification for
why Liberia and Sierra Leone breached their international obligations by
entering into the Accra and Lom6 agreements.
Regardless, this argument fails in the case of Liberia and Sierra
Leone because neither the Taylor or Kabbah regimes claimed to invoke a
305. Kwadwo Boateng Mensah, Preventing Constitutional Crises in ECOWAS After
Togo, ALLAFRICA.COM, Mar. 15, 2005; ECOWAS Press Release, Faure Gnassingbe Steps
Down ECOWAS Lifts Sanctions, Feb. 26, 2005, available at http://www.ecowas.int/ (last
visited June 25, 2006); Sao Tome and Principe: Coup Leaders Hand Power Back to Civilian
President, INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORK (IRIN), July 23, 2003, available at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=35580&SelectRegion=West-Africa&SelectC
ountry=SAOTOMEANDPRINCIPE (last visited Aug. 25, 2006); Sao Tome Coup Con-
demned, BBC NEWS, July 17, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
3073631.stm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006); COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATION, MORE THAN
HUMANITARIANISM: A STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TOWARD AFRICA, INDEPENDENT TASK
FORCE REPORT No. 56 90 (2006).
306. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 62 (1).
307. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 73.
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right to terminate or withdraw from any treaties to which they there were
bound."' Furthermore, in both cases the fundamental change (i.e., civil
war leading to the peace accords) was, in part, the result of the two gov-
ernments not honoring their own human rights obligation to refrain from
committing atrocities.'09 Moreover, under the VCLT, by entering into the
Accra and Lom6 accords in contravention of governing international law
norms, Liberia and Sierra Leone materially breached vital provisions
"essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose" of several
treaties. ° Finally, the VCLT does not permit any derogation from treaty
provisions "relating to the protection of the human person contained in
treaties of a humanitarian character," which would apply to nearly all of
the human rights- and democracy-orientated treaties under examination
in this section and below."'
Another rationale that might justify amnesty and power-sharing un-
der the Accra and Lom6 agreements appears in the International Law
Commission (ILC) Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts (ILCASR), which state that a government may
invoke a state of necessity as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation, so long as
308. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 62(2). Although it is not absolutely clear whether a state
must make an invocation expressly (e.g., in writing) or can achieve it by implication (e.g.,
taking action contrary to obligations), state practice favors the former approach.
309. Id. Human rights reports of governmental and nongovernmental organizations cited
in earlier sections and the indictments of former President Charles Taylor and senior officials
in the Kabbah government (e.g., former Vice-Minister of Defense and Internal Affairs Minis-
ter Samuel Hinga Norman) before the Sierra Leone Special Court for war crimes and crimes
against humanity speak volumes about the nefarious conduct of each government during their
respective civil wars.
310. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 60(3)(b).
311. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 60(5). The same legal logic applies to and nullifies the
"limited" derogation provisions in article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 4(1) of the ICCPR states:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may
take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such meas-
ures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, relig-
ion or social origin.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also U.N. Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC], Sub-
Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/1984/4 (1984). It should be noted that the ICCPR
obligates states to immediately notify other states parties and the UN Secretary-General as to
the provisions it has derogated from and the reasons for such actions. The Taylor and Kabbah
regimes made no such claim of derogation under the VCLT or the ICCPR.
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the government acts to safeguard an "essential interest of the State
against a grave and imminent peril" and does not "seriously impair an
essential interest of the state" toward which the obligation exists.3 2 The
ILC considers an essential interest of a state one that is "extremely
grave" and "imminent," and the wrongful act must be the only way to
ward off the grave and imminent peril and "preserv[e] the essential in-
terest threatened.*3 3
Certainly, the violent insurgencies that forced the Taylor and Kabbah
regimes to enter into power-sharing agreements were to some degree
designed to safeguard the state from the violence of the LURD and RUF,
respectively, and thus served an essential interest. Nevertheless, a wrong-
ful act cannot be precluded if the state claiming necessity-which
Liberia or Sierra Leone did not formally do--"provoked, either deliber-
ately or by negligence, the occurrence of the state of necessity."'3 14 As
discussed above, Liberia and Sierra Leone partially provoked the civil
wars leading to their states of necessity by violating their human rights
obligations-particularly through their corruption, their arguably oppres-
sive treatment of their citizenry, and their unwillingness to refrain from
committing atrocities. Moreover, under the ILCASR commentary, it is
not clear whether the vital interests the governments sacrificed (e.g., jus-
tice for amnesty and democracy for power-sharing) are "obviously" less
important than their aims of peace and security.3t5 In fact, the forgoing
analysis signals that sacrificing justice and democracy at the alter of the
perceived public good creates a culture of impunity and is politically
untenable over the long-term. The ILCASR further complicates any ne-
cessity claims by precluding the invocation of a state of necessity when a
state commits a wrongful act that violates its international obligations,
particularly those under treaties and peremptory norms of international
law.3 16 As the following sections will reveal, power-sharing under the Ac-
cra and Lom6 agreements violated treaty-based human rights and
prodemocratic norms in AU, ECOWAS, and UN law (and arguably con-
travened the preemptory norm of self-determination), thereby "excluding
the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with respect to that obli-
gation"-namely the responsibility to protect human rights and
democracy."7
312. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 33(l)(a),
Official Records of the General Assembly, 56th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10), ch. V (Dec.
2001).
313. INT'L L. COMM'N, COMMENTARIES, 33, in IWC ANN. REP. 2001, ch. IV.
314. Id. [34.
315. Id. 35.
316. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note
312, arts. 33(2)(a-b).
317. Id. arts. 33(2)(a-c).
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In addition, member states of the AU and ECOWAS appear to have
violated the international principle pacta sunt servanda, as they assisted
in negotiating and sanctioned power-sharing deals in Liberia and Sierra
Leone that clearly contravened the core human rights and democracy and
governance principles enshrined in AU and ECOWAS law.
18 Moreover,
given that the Accra and Lom6 accords are internal/domestic law as op-
posed to external/international law, Liberia and Sierra Leone may not
invoke or rely on any provisions in the accords or the circumstances that
produced them as a justification for their failure to perform treaty obliga-
tions under AU and ECOWAS law.319 As James Crawford has noted, "[I]t
is established that national law, no matter how democratically estab-
lished, is not an excuse for failure to comply with international
obligations. 3 20 If this assertion is correct, then it goes without saying that
unlawful internal law is devoid of authority in relation to a state's inter-
national legal obligations. In addition, the AU and ECOWAS are bound
to comport with their own statutes; under international law, regional or-
ganizations may not take actions inconsistent with or beyond the scope
of their constitutive instruments and related guidelines. Further, as previ-
ously noted, member states of the AU and ECOWAS, including Liberia
and Sierra Leone, also have a positive duty to abide by the law, princi-
ples, and procedure of the organizations in good faith.32
Unless otherwise stated, all of the statutes in Table 1 apply to Liberia
and four apply to Sierra Leone (the others either did not exist or were not
in force when the Lom6 Agreement was adopted). Very few interpre-
tive comments or sources, including traveaux pr~paratoires, exist to
illuminate the meaning of the AU and ECOWAS treaties; hence, this Ar-
ticle employs a teleological interpretive approach with a dose of original
intent.3 23 This approach is especially necessary because several of the
applicable treaties are new and no judicial mechanism or other body has
interpreted them.
318. According to article 26 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, the inter-
national principle pacta sun servanda states that "every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." VCLT, supra note 2, art. 26.
319. Article 27 of the VCLT states that a "[p]arty may not invoke the provision of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." VCLT, supra note 2, art. 27.
320. Crawford, supra note 24, at 117.
321. Article 26 of the VCLT indicates that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." VCLT, supra note 2, art. 26.
322. They include the AU Constitutive Act, the AU Peace and Security Protocol, the
ECOWAS Democracy Protocol, and the NEPAD.
323. It has been the author's experience in working with decisionmakers in Africa that
the majority of legal officers in African multilateral institutions employ a literalist approach in
interpreting their own treaties.
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1. AU Law and Practice
The AU human rights and democracy and governance regimes have
significantly evolved since the founding of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) in 1963.2 Three major phenomena birthed and shaped the
OAU: Africa's struggle against colonization-imperialism, decolonization,
and the Cold War.15 The OAU began in 1963 as a highly state-centric
organization with the primary purpose of promoting unity and coopera-
tion among African states while maintaining strict adherence and respect
for the international principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and noninterference in internal affairs.326 At the turn of the twenty-first
century, the AU replaced the OAU and evolved from an institution pre-
occupied with states' rights to one concerned with the plight of African
people. As the following analysis will reveal, human rights, democracy,
the rule of law, and development have become key objectives of the AU.
This commitment is evident in the AU's fashioning of new human rights
and collective security-oriented regimes that constrain the behavior of
states and their institutions both domestically and transnationally, par-
ticularly in their treatment of people.
i. African Charter on Human and People's Rights
(Banjul Charter)
Today, the AU human rights and democracy and governance regimes
are unmistakably clear as to the role states should play in promoting and
protecting fundamental human rights.3 2 7 Yet the power-sharing provisions
in the Accra and Lom6 accords violated the spirit and substance of AU
law and practice. The Banjul Charter states that "every individual shall
be equal before the law" and "entitled to equal protection before the
law., 328 What does it mean to be equal before the law? The Charter guar-
antees every individual the right to have his or her "cause heard,"
including the "right to an appeal to competent national organs against
acts violating [ ... ] fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by
conventions, laws, regulations and custom in force. 329 The power-
sharing and amnesty provisions in the Accra and Lom6 accords contra-
324. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS ON CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND JUDICIAL
ISSUES 51-52 (Jeremy Levitt ed., 2003).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See generally RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO
THE AU (2004).
328. African Charter on Human and People's Rights art. 3, June 27, 1981, reprinted in
AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 354 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. The
Banjul Charter was adopted on June 27, 1981, and entered force into force October 21, 1986.
329. Id. art. 7.
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vened these rights because they denied equal protection to victims of the
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly women and children,330
by not providing them any venue to adjudicate their criminal, civil, po-
litical, gender, and human rights-related claims.
Moreover, the Banjul Charter assures citizens the "unquestionable
and inalienable right to self-determination"33' and the "right to participate
freely in the government of his [her] country:' directly or through freely
chosen representatives in accordance with the law.332 The Banjul Char-
ter's strong emphasis on self-determination derives from the OAU's
approach to human rights, which placed the "two issues of self-
determination and apartheid/racial discrimination in southern Africa" at
the core of the organization.333 In this context, armed struggle was
viewed as a legitimate basis of asserting the "right of self-determination
of a colonial or oppressed people."" Thus, as John Dugard has noted,
the OAU Charter was viewed as more than a constitutive act-it was a
"charter of liberation. '3 - Beginning in the 1970s, the OAU's notion of
self-determination evolved from one that was purely state-centered and
preoccupied with colonial rule to one that recognized, through the Ban-
jul Charter, the expansion of the concept as a fundamental human right.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the OAU viewed self-determination
as inseparable from what Thomas Franck has referred to as the
330. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) will not be
analyzed in this section. Briefly, it seeks to define and protect the rights of children in every
facet of human existence from, for example, a right to a birth name and nationality to a right
to education and health services. The African Charter also seeks to protect children from,
among other things, economic exploitation, child abuse, torture, harmful social and cultural
practices, and, most important for the purposes of this analysis, armed conflicts. Under article
22 of the ACRWC, children are not to take part in direct hostilities and governments are to
refrain from recruiting them. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 22,
July 1990, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 402 [hereinafter
ACRWC].
331. Banjul Charter, supra note 328, art. 20. Self-determination may be defined as the
right of a people to determine and live under a type of government they choose free from out-
side influence.
332. Banjul Charter, supra note 328, art. 12.
333. Rachel Murray, supra note 327, at 8. In the years that followed, these issues guided
the organization's approach to human fights, which focused on the "protection of the state, not
the individual" as the concept of human rights "went little beyond the notion of self-
determination in the context of decolonization and apartheid... ." Id. at 7-8.
334. Ifeoma Enemo, Self-Determination as the Fundamental Basis of the Concept of
Legitimate Governance under the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, in LEGITI-
MATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 417
(E.K. Quashigah & O.C. Okafor eds., 1999). See also Murray, supra note 327, at 10.
335. John Dugard, The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism: an Inquiry into
the Pleas of Self-Defense as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Coloni-
alism, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 157, 158-59 (1967).
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democratic entitlement. 336 It was this democracy-based notion of self-
determination that the Accra and Lom6 agreements abridged,
ii. Grand Bay Mauritius Declaration and Plan of Action of the
Organization of African Unity (Grand Bay Declaration)
The Grand Bay Declaration built on the Banjul Charter by seeking to
assist member states in instituting plans for implementing the charter's
human rights provisions. It acknowledged the importance of human
rights as a "key tool for promoting collective security, durable peace and
sustainable development" and the need to "constructively examine hu-
man rights issues in a spirit of justice, impartiality and non-selectivity,
avoiding their use for political purposes [e.g., amnesty]." '' The power-
sharing provisions in the Accra and Lom6 accords did not serve the in-
terests of justice;33 rather, they impinged the right to self-determination
of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans by empowering warlords and rebels to
rule over them without their consent and denying them any venue to
challenge the accords' peace prescriptions or adjudicate human rights
claims.
In this sense, power-sharing was a political compromise between the
protection of human rights and self-determination on one hand and peace
as a public good on the other. Thus, as a purely political policy prescrip-
tion, it breached the spirit and substance of the Grand Bay Declaration.
Furthermore, power-sharing undermined the declaration's provisions
concerning the perpetration of "acts of genocide, crimes against human-
ity and other war crimes," which called for African states to ensure that
"these serious acts of violation be adequately dealt with"-that is, pun-
ished.339 Power-sharing under the Accra and Lom6 agreements also
conflicted with the underlying logic of the Grand Bay Declaration,
which affirmed the interdependence of the principles of democracy, good
governance, and the rule of law and concluded that "unconstitutional
changes in governments" often cause human rights violations.3 °
336. Murray, supra note 327 at 16-17, 22-23. See generally Thomas Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. JUR. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
337. Grand Bay Mauritius Declaration and Plan of Action of the Organization of African
Unity (April 1999), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 374
[hereinafter Grand Bay Declaration].
338. The function of justice in this context "is to provide a foundation for dismantling
institutions and discrediting leaders and their ideology that have promoted war crimes." Mi-
chael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and Anti-justice in the Peace-
building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 161, 171 (2003).
339. Grand Bay Declaration, supra note 337.
340. Id. art. 8(16).
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iii. Constitutive Act of the African Union
The human rights principles in the Banjul Charter are reinforced by
the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which has as one of its core
objectives the promotion and protection of "human and people's rights in
accordance with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and
other relevant human rights instruments."34' It also seeks to promote and
respect "democratic principles and institutions," "popular participation,"
"human rights," and the "rule of law and good governance" 2 and rejects
and condemns "unconstitutional changes in government."4 3 Not only
does AU law reject unconstitutional changes in government, it places a
duty on the AU to suspend from participation any governments that
"come to power through unconstitutional means."3" This includes politi-
cal transitions and arrangements precipitated by coups d'etat or other
violent means, irrespective of whether such deals are endorsed by gov-
ernments. How, then, could the AU justify its support for power-sharing
in the Accra Agreement? According to the principles of the Constitutive
Act, the AU and ECOWAS' formal endorsement of the Accra Agreement
clearly violated AU law.
Unlike the Accra Agreement, the Lom6 Agreement was not bound
by the provisions of the Constitutive Act because its entry into force pre-
ceded the Act; it was, however, subject to the provisions of the Act's
predecessor, the OAU Charter. The preamble of the state-centered char-
ter considered human rights and the "cause of human progress" critical
factors for peace and security. Moreover, OAU practice-particularly its
human rights-based peace observation missions in, among other places,
Chad in 1981 and Burundi in 1993, its condemnation of the coup d'6tat
against the Kabbah regime in Sierra Leone in 1997, and its precedent-
setting request that ECOWAS restore Kabbah to power--demonstrate
that well-settled human rights law and an emerging practice of prode-
mocratic intervention were in existence when the Lom6 Agreement
entered into force. Hence, both accords ran afoul of well-established
human rights law and newly established prodemocracy and governance
rules of the OAU and AU, respectively.
iv. New Partnership for Africa's Development
The Peace and Security and Democracy and Political Governance
initiatives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
341. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), June 11, 2000, reprinted in AFRICA:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 35.
342. Id. arts. 3(h), 4(m).
343. Id. art. 4(p).
344. Id. art. 30.
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echo the human rights and democracy-related principles in the conven-
tions in Table 1 by acknowledging that development is impossible in the
"absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good
governance."3 45 If this is indeed true, how can extralegal power-sharing of
the kind found in the Accra and Lom6 agreements be justified, given that
they seem to grossly offend democracy, human rights, and good govern-
ance? Under the NEPAD, African states agreed to "respect the global
standards of democracy," allowing for fair democratic elections to "en-
able people to choose their leaders freely" and achieve "basic standards
of good governance and democratic behavior. ' 46 Yet, whether working
through regional institutions such as the AU or acting individually, Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone shared power out of fear and under coercion in
abrogation of prevailing global standards of democracy-and with AU
and ECOWAS approval. The NEPAD framework was adopted and appli-
cable before the entry into force of the Accra Agreement; it did not exist
when the Lom6 Agreement was signed into force. Nevertheless,
NEPAD's core principles were enshrined in the Draft Kampala Docu-
ment for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and accepted by nearly all African
states, including Sierra Leone, before the Lom6 peace process. 3 7 Hence,
the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone had a positive duty not to
violate NEPAD's democracy principles (in the case of Liberia) or sub-
vert democracy by sharing power unlawfully and undemocratically.
v. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union (AUPSC Protocol)
Finally, the AUPSC Protocol, the most current statement of AU law
and policy on peace and security matters, receives guidance from the
following principles, among others: "respect for the rule of law, funda-
mental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and
international humanitarian law."34 ' In fact, both the AU Constitutive Act
and AUPSC Protocol empower the AU to initiate and/or authorize a mili-
tary intervention in member states to halt or remedy "grave
345. NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFR. DEV., STRATEGY DOCUMENT 17 (Oct. 2001). The New
Partnership for African Development is a program of action established by African leaders to
renew the African continent through a series of initiatives in conflict mitigation, human rights,
the rule of law, democracy and governance, security, macroeconomics, fiscal regulation,
health, education, and human and social development.
346. Id.
347. Draft Kampala Document for a Proposed Conference on Security, Stability, Devel-
opment and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
supra note 324, at 227.
348. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union art. 4(c), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 167.
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circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against human-
ity" and to "institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of
Government takes place."3 9 Hence, under the AUPSC and other AU law,
the notion of entering into or sanctioning unlawfully-derived peace deals
antithetical to human rights and democracy norms in the region belies
lawfulness. The AUPSC Protocol was adopted before the Accra Agree-
ment but after the Lom6 Agreement and thus was not applicable to the
latter; its core objectives, however, with the exception of military inter-
vention, formed a part of the declaration establishing the OAU conflict
mechanism.3 Nevertheless, the Accra and Lom6 agreements ignored
OAU/AU law and doctrine and fashioned political orders adverse to de-
mocratic and rule-based societies. Here, the AU, ECOWAS, and the
Kabbah and Taylor governments share the taint of unlawfulness. What is
the normative value of comprehensive human rights and prodemocracy
rules if they can be contracted away by self-interested political elites and
regional decisionmakers?
The next section will examine the legality of power-sharing under
ECOWAS law.
2. ECOWAS Law and Practice
i. ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993
ECOWAS law does not establish an independent human rights re-
gime, although it does provide for a unique collective security system
concerned with protecting fundamental human rights and promoting de-
mocracy and good governance. According to the law, doctrine, and
practice of the African region, ECOWAS, as a subregional organization,
is politically and legally subordinate to the AU35-hence, its member
states are bound to adhere to the AU human rights protective regime. For
example, the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 (Revised Treaty) states
that ECOWAS will cooperate with the AU and requires member states to
declare their adherence to the "recognition, promotion and protection of
human and people's rights in accordance with the provisions of the
349. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 169; Consti-
tutive Act of the African Union arts. 4(e), 4(g), 4(h), 
4 (p), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 41-42.
350. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establish-
ment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 219. The OAU Conflict Mechanism was concerned with pre-
venting, managing, and resolving civil wars, given their devastating impact on Africa's
sociopolitical order and developmental landscape.
351. This interpretation is implied in AU and ECOWAS law and expressed in African
international organizational practice.
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African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 352 Hence, the Accra and
Lom6 agreements are just as unlawful under ECOWAS law as under the
Banjul Charter. Of course, under article 58 of the Revised Treaty,
ECOWAS does seek the maintenance of "peace, stability, security," the
"promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance,"
and the "timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state
conflicts" through public diplomacy and regional peacekeeping.353 But
since, as members of the AU, ECOWAS member states subscribe to the
AU human rights regime, the intermittent problem of civil war and state
disorder in the region caused ECOWAS to evolve a radical collective
security mechanism precisely to protect universal human rights and de-
mocracy. The power-sharing provisions in the accords thus ran afoul of
the ECOWAS Revised Treaty's recognition of democracy as an entitle-
ment, and accordingly they must be deemed unlawful despite claims of
serving the public good.
ii. ECOWAS Framework and Protocol on Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
The ECOWAS Framework Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
(ECOWAS Framework) and the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Pre-
vention, Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security (ECOWAS Conflict Protocol), which are principally concerned
with the "protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and the
rules of international humanitarian law,"'354 combine to form the most
radical regional security framework in the world. The ECOWAS Frame-
work and Conflict Protocol empowered ECOWAS, through ECOMOG,
to undertake humanitarian intervention to enforce peace and preserve
democratic institutions in internal and interstate conflict situations that
"[t]hreaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster," "[p]ose a serious threat to
peace and security in the sub-region," or "[e]rupt following the over-
352. Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States arts. 4(g), 83,
July 1993, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 68.
353. Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States arts. 4(), 58,
July 1993, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 68, 95.
354. Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict, Prevention, Manage-
ment, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security art. 2(d), December 1999, reprinted in AFRICA:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 264. The Framework Establishing the Economic
Community of West African States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolu-
tion, Peacekeeping and Security is a binding mechanism that provides for interstate
collaboration in the collective management of regional security and served as the framework
for, and eventually replaced, the ECOWAS Conflict Protocol. Article 3 of the Conflict Proto-
col, however, states that paragraph 46 of the ECOWAS Framework remains controlling when
addressing internal and interstate conflicts.
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throw or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected govern-
ment., 355 Article 46 of the ECOWAS Framework is nearly identical to
article 25 of the ECOWAS Conflict Protocol, except that the latter ex-
plicitly states that intervention is lawful to halt a "massive violation of
human rights and the rule of law" whereas the former mechanism merely
implies such a right.356 The inclusion of the provision to employ force to
protect human rights and democracy is novel, making ECOWAS the only
regional organization to codify such rights.
The Accra Agreement was agreed upon after the enactment of the
ECOWAS Framework and Conflict Protocol; Liberia and ECOWAS
were thus bound by their provisions. At a minimum, they were under a
duty not to sanction peace deals that subverted regional human rights
and democracy and governance doctrine and practice by sharing power
with warlords and rebels. The Lom6 Agreement entered into force after
the ECOWAS Framework was instituted but before the Conflict Protocol
was adopted; hence, under the Framework, Sierra Leone and ECOWAS
were under a similar duty not to endorse political arrangements that vio-
lated universal human rights or prodemocracy law as outlined in
ECOWAS law.3"7
iii. ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
Finally, the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Govern-
ance (ECOWAS Democracy Protocol) recognizes that in order for
ECOWAS to be an effective peace broker, it must pay special attention to
the inherent linkages between "internal crises, democracy and good gov-
ernance, the rule of law, and human rights.""35 In this context, the
ECOWAS Democracy Protocol requires ECOWAS member states to es-
tablish mechanisms that promote, protect, and enforce democracy and
human rights as a matter of law and policy and obligates them to en-
shrine democracy as, in Samuel Barnes's phrase, "an institutionalized
process of decision making and societal learning, not a substantive
355. Framework Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict, Prevention, Man-
agement, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security art. 46, October 1999, reprinted in AFRICA:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 289 (emphasis added); Protocol Relating to the
ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict, Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security art. 25, December 1999, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note
324, at 274.
356. Id.
357. See Framework Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict, Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security art. 46, October 1999, in AFRICA: SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 324, at 287.
358. Protocol A/SPI/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
keeping and Security, preamble, ECOWAS, Dec. 21, 2001 (unpublished document on file with
author).
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formula for a regime."35 9 The Protocol also forbids all cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment of civilians and combatants during times of war
and peace.' 6° It specifically endorses the notion of empowering the
ECOWAS Court of Justice to adjudicate cases "relating to violations of
human rights" after domestic remedies have been exhausted16 ' and deems
as essential the elimination of "all forms of discrimination and harmful
and degrading practices against women. 361 Lastly, it confirms that in
West Africa, democracy is an entitlement to be respected, promoted, and
preserved, by prodemocratic intervention if necessary. The Democracy
Protocol came into force after the Lom6 Agreement was adopted and
before the Accra Agreement was implemented; thus, Liberia was under a
duty not to grant amnesty to and share power with warlords and rebels
who acquired power violently and undemocratically from a democrati-
cally-elected regime and are responsible for the commission of
atrocities. For these reasons, ECOWAS should not have sanctioned the
Accra Agreement; in doing so it acted unlawfully and negligently. Nev-
ertheless, it remains to be seen whether the influence of the ECOWAS
Democracy Protocol will sway ECOWAS to institute an approach to ne-
gotiating peace that does not allow for coerced power-sharing.
iv. Conclusion
Given this background, it is abundantly clear that the AU and
ECOWAS have advanced comprehensive security-related human rights
and democracy and governance regimes that codify existing regional
custom (e.g., a right to humanitarian intervention) and fashion new treaty
norms (e.g., a right to democracy and prodemocratic intervention).6 By
entering into the Accra and Lom6 agreements, the governments of Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone, respectively, failed to abide by their international
obligations under AU and ECOWAS law to protect and promote settled
human rights and democracy norms in the West African region. More-
over, the AU and ECOWAS failed to follow their own rules by
christening these peace deals; when political necessity and expediency
caused them to sanction the illegal Accra and Lom6 agreements, these
359. Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Post Conflict
Societies, 95 AM J. INT'L L. 86, 89 (2001).
360. Protocol A/SPI/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, supra note 358, arts.
22(2), 23, 33(1), 34, 35(1).
361. Id. art. 39.
362. Id. art. 40.
363. Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, supra note 303; Levitt,
Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, supra note 303.
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organizations operated in a lawless realm where the rule of law is forced
to submit to unlawful and unviable political prescriptions.
The next section examines the legality of the Accra and Lom6 ac-
cords under universal international law, particularly UN law and practice
and customary international law.
3. Universal International Law
As the preceding section discussed, the Accra and Lom6 accords of-
fended international human rights law and settled democracy and
governance norms. Not only have the governments of Liberia and Sierra
Leone failed to abide by international law standards; the UN, the AU,
and ECOWAS, as moral guarantors of the Accra and Lomd agreements,
violated these principles as well. This analysis will primarily focus on
the following treaties and the customary international law norms found
within them: the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration); the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
i. The United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
The Preamble of the UN Charter states that "the peoples of the
United Nations" are "determined to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war," "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person," and "establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained. ' 3 4 Key objectives
of the UN are the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, the
suppression of acts of aggression and breaches to the peace, and, in con-
sonance with the "principles of justice and international law," the
settlement of "international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace. '365 The Charter also recognizes the "rights of self-
determination of peoples" and the need to "strengthen universal peace"
through the promotion and encouragement of respect for fundamental
human rights and freedoms.366 To these ends, UN member states pledge
to unite their "strength to maintain international peace and security, 367
which the UN Security Council has broadly construed to include the pro-
tection of human rights and democracy and the management of interstate
364. U.N. Charter preamble.
365. U.N. Charter art. 1(1).
366. Id.
367. U.N. Charter art. 2(3).
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and intrastate conflicts.368 Similarly, the UN Charter's human rights com-
panion, the Declaration, states that the "peoples of the United Nations
have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person.'3 69 The Declaration stresses
the pledge made by UN member states, including Liberia and Sierra
Leone, to promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms"; 370 asserts that every person has the "right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
their fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law",,;
371
and mandates that the will of the people is the basis of the authority of
government and that every person has the "right to take part in the gov-
ernment of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives."7 W. Michael Reisman considers the Declaration de-
claratory of customary international law, particularly article 21(3),
which provides that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the au-
thority of government."3 74 The UN Human Rights Committee has
explicitly interpreted the Declaration's descriptive acknowledgement of a
right of self-determination as an "essential condition for the effective
guarantee and observance of individual human rights. 375
The Accra and Lom6 agreements violated the spirit and substance of
the UN Charter and Declaration. They arguably undermined justice and
the rule of law and impinged on the dignity of the human person and
fundamental human rights by granting amnesty and power-sharing,
thereby denying war victims a venue and effective remedy for human
rights abuses. Consequently, the accords failed to promote universal re-
spect for human rights and sent the signal to future warlords, rebels, and
abusers that violence is an acceptable way to obtain political power and
economic rewards. The power-sharing provisions in the accords abro-
gated the right of self-determination of the domestic populations of
Liberia and Sierra Leone-their right to choose their state's basis of au-
thority, their form of government, and representatives to act on their
behalf. It is clear that despite the existence of rules and doctrine to the
368. See generally Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, supra
note 303; Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The
Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, supra note 303.
369. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (RI)A, at 71, preamble,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
370. Id.
371. Id. art. 8.
372. Id. art. 21.
373. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867 (1990).
374. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 369, art. 21(3).
375. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment 12: The Right of Self-Determination of
Peoples (Art. 1), 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 1984).
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contrary, the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone contracted for,
and the UN and ECOWAS morally guaranteed, coerced peace agree-
ments in derogation of the aforementioned rules.
ii.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR recognizes that the "inherent dignity" and "equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.'376 It asserts that the realiza-
tion of full civil and political rights can be attained only through
enabling environments where all facets of society may enjoy them, and it
obliges states to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and freedoms." '377 By seemingly rewarding perpetrators of
human atrocities-in effect placing criminals on a higher footing than
their victims-the Accra and Lom6 agreements do not appear to value
the dignity and equal rights of the casualties of armed conflict. The ac-
cords prevented war victims from gaining an "effective remedy" from a
"competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities ' '37s and thus
generally impinged on the notion of respecting and observing human
rights enshrined in the ICCPR.
The ICCPR places a positive duty on states to conduct impartial hu-
man rights investigations and bring perpetrators to justice, regardless of
whether public (e.g., government officials in the Taylor and Kabbah re-
gimes) or private persons (e.g., RUF and LURD rebel group members
and mercenaries) are responsible for violating rights guaranteed in the
Covenant.379 The failure to do so "could in and of itself give rise to a
separate breach of the Covenant. ' '310 In addition, the ICCPR places a duty
on states to prevent a recurrence of breaches, 8 which in the context of
Liberia and Sierra Leone would appear to include a duty not to empower
perpetrators of atrocities with the authority (e.g., government positions)
376. ICCPR, supra note 311, preamble. The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Optional
Protocol), which was adopted on December 16, 1966 (entry into force on March 23, 1976),
does not apply to the Accra Agreement because Liberia only became a signatory to the Op-
tional Protocol on September 22, 2004, after the Agreement came into force. Sierra Leone
however did accede to the Optional Protocol on August 23, 1996, nearly three years after the
Lomd Agreements entered into force; hence, it can be argued that the Government of Sierra
Leone's amnesty provision in the Lomd Agreement constituted a breach of the Protocol, par-
ticularly its guarantee of the right of the individual to submit claims before it for breaches of
the ICCPR.
377. Id.
378. Id. arts. 2(3)(a-c).
379. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment 31 [801: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 8, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/
Rev.l/Add.13. (May 26, 2004).
380. Id. 15.
381. Id. 17.
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to commit further human rights violations. Stated differently, the ICCPR
seems to prohibit states from giving amnesty to and power-sharing with
serious human rights abusers.
The ICCPR obligates states parties to effectively protect Covenant
rights, particularly the individual right to an effective remedy, which re-
quires governments, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, to "make
reparation" to war victims.82 In fact, the ICCPR requires both states to
provide effective remedies for any violation of the provisions of the
Covenant, especially those violations committed by government officials
and rebels acting in their territories.383 Moreover, the provision of an ef-
fective remedy constitutes a nonderogable treaty obligation;384 hence,
without reparation "to those individuals whose Covenant rights have
been violated," a state cannot discharge its obligation, critical to the
ICCPR, to provide a remedy. 35 The failure to provide an effective rem-
edy to war victims, combined with policy determinations that force war
victims to live under the rule of their abusers, seemingly violates article
7 of the ICCPR, which seeks to protect the dignity and the physical and
mental integrity of the individual. In this sense, power-sharing can be an
unusually cruel way to make peace and serve the public good. It follows
that the Kabbah and Taylor regimes violated the ICCPR by not ensuring
that the Accra and Lom6 agreements included an effective remedy for
victims of atrocities (e.g., torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment) committed during their respective wars.
Moreover, sharing power under the accords seems to conflict with
the ICCPR's principles of democracy and self-determination and hence
the freedom of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans to participate in the con-
duct of public affairs386 and determine their political futures-rather than
see political elites contract them away.387 David Wippman notes that
while power-sharing may be "politically desirable and operationally fea-
sible," it should not be assumed that it is "necessarily compatible with
international law or the policies that underlie it."388 He further states that
under contemporary international law, "self-determination has been
transformed in a large part into a democratic entitlement-that is, a right
to representative government shared by all of the people residing within
382. Id.
383. General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), supra note 298, 14.
384. Id.
385. Id. 1 16. The Committee notes that proper reparation may include restitution, reha-
bilitation, public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition, changes in
relevant laws and practices, and most important for this analysis, bringing the perpetrators to
justice for human rights violations. Id.
386. ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 25(a).
387. Id. art. 1.
388. Wippman, supra note 41, at 227.
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a given state.' 389 Moreover, General Comment 25 to the ICCPR recog-
nizes that the right of every citizen to take direct part in the conduct of
public affairs "lies at the core of democratic government based on the
consent of the people" and must be protected.39 Political power-sharing
arrangements are incompatible with the ICCPR's "right of political par-
ticipation" when citizens are denied meaningful participation in their
creation and thus the "political life of the state. 39'
The political elites that entered the accords abrogated the right of
self-determination of the peoples of Liberia and Sierra Leone by secur-
ing neither their participation nor their consent.3 92 Still, the extent to
which the Accra and Lom6 agreements violated the principle of self-
determination, arguably a nonderogable right, differed due to the wide-
spread support among Liberians for the insurrection that eventually led
to the resignation of Taylor and disbandment of his regime.39
3 In contrast,
Sierra Leoneans heatedly contested the coup that displaced the Kabbah
government. This dichotomy may explain why the "soft" power-sharing
in the Lom6 Agreement does not appear to offend the principle of self-
determination to the same extent as "hard" power-sharing under the Ac-
cra Agreement. Nevertheless, the ICCPR does not permit states under
any circumstance to derogate from norms such as self-determination.
Another troubling aspect of the Accra and Lom6 agreements was the
blatant failure of both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean governments to
ensure the accords entitled all persons in their territories to equal protec-
tion of the law, which includes, in particular, a right for war victims-as
a class-to seek judicial remedies for crimes committed against them
during war.39 All Liberians and Sierra Leoneans are entitled to the pro-
tections in the ICCPR without distinction of any kind-which precludes
the arrangement that granted amnesty to, and shared power with, war-
lords and rebels on one hand while politically and legally
disenfranchising war victims on the other. As previously noted, not even
during public emergencies or situations threatening the "life of the na-
tion" may states parties to the ICCPR derogate from their obligations
389. Id. at 228.
390. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in
Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25), 1,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 I/Rev. lI/Add.7 (Dec. 7, 1996).
391. Wippman, supra note 41, at 229.
392. Sharing power under the Accra and Lomd agreements also breached the "right and
opportunity of citizens to have access on general terms of equality to public service positions"
because cabinet-level and other posts were undemocratically awarded to members of the war-
ring parties. ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 25.
393. Conversely, it may be argued that the case for self-determination in this instance is
weakened because Liberians democratically elected Taylor before he was forced into exile.
394. ICCPR, supra note 311, art. 26.
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under the treaty if such action would be "inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law" (e.g., the ensuring of equal protec-
tion before the law).3  Other obligations stem from treaty law and
customary international law, including the governing AU and ECOWAS
rules, as well as from nonderogable human rights norms. Moreover, the
governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone did not formally declare any
state of emergency or a right of derogation from their obligations under
the ICCPR. 96 Hence, to the extent power-sharing offends the human
rights and democracy and governance-related norms in the ICCPR and
in international law generally, the Taylor and Kabbah governments
unlawfully entered into, and their institutional patrons (the AU,
ECOWAS and the UN) sanctioned, illegal peace deals under the ICCPR.
iii. International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
Liberia signed the ICESCR before the Accra Agreement and there-
fore had at least a positive duty not to defeat its object and purpose, and
Sierra Leone acceded to the Covenant before the Lom6 peace process
began.397 The ICESCR recognizes that the "inherent dignity" and "equal
and alienable rights" of all people is the "foundation of freedom, justice
and peace"; in this respect all states are obligated to "promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms." '39 As previ-
ously noted, the amnesty and power-sharing provisions in the accords
appear to trample on the dignity of the individual by forcing Liberians
and Sierra Leoneans to exist, without an effective remedy, under the rule
of warlords.39 On this point, article 5 of the ICESCR prohibits any state
(Liberia and Sierra Leone), group, or individual (Taylor, Kabbah, and
UN, AU, and ECOWAS officials) from engaging in any activity or act
aimed at the destruction or limitation of any of the rights or freedoms in
the Covenant,4°° which the power-sharing provisions in the accords
clearly do.
As previous sections demonstrate, similar to the Declaration and
ICCPR, the ICESCR states that all people have a "right of self-
395. Id. art. 4(1).
396. Id.
397. See VCLT, supra note 2, art. 18. The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was signed and ratified by Liberia on April 18, 1970, and Sep-
tember 22, 2004, respectively, and acceded to by Sierra Leone on August 23, 1996.
398. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights preamble, Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
399. See UN Human. Rights Commission, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of
States Parties'Obligations (Art. 2, para 1, of the Covenant), 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7
(May 12, 2004).
400. ICESCR, supra note 398, art. 5.
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determination" and hence the right to "determine their political status."
States parties may only limit such rights to the extent domestic law al-
lows and only if such limitations are compatible with the "nature of the
rights" in the ICESCR and "solely for the purpose of promoting the gen-
eral welfare in a democratic society."" ' Does sharing power unlawfully
with rebel groups responsible for committing human atrocities promote
the general welfare in a democratic society? Sharing power extra-
constitutionally itself is problematic, but doing so without the explicit
consent of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans interferes with their right of
self-determination and their freedom to determine their own political
status. Since Liberia and Sierra Leone were parties to the ICESCR when
the Accra and Lom6 agreements were adopted, both states were duty-
bound to implement or operationalize its provisions. In this sense, forced
power-sharing impinges on the inherent dignity and freedom of war vic-
tims and others by embracing impunity and denying them the right to
choose their own form of government and their representatives.
iv. Conclusion
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Accra and Lom6
agreements violated the fundamental tenets underpinning international
human rights law and corollary democracy and governance norms. The
intersection between human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the
UN Charter, the Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR is critical, as
"one common catalyst for democracy is the rule of law-independent
and effective judicial systems that can force officials to act within their
legal authority" and not exceed it, irrespective of prevailing circum-
stances.4 Sharing power with those responsible for directing or
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity undermines the es-
sence of the UN Charter, customary international law, and the gamut of
human rights conventions that disallow impunity for heinous crimes,
requires their investigation, prosecution, and punishment, and obligates
states to promote respect for the rule of law, justice, good governance,
and self-determination. By entering into the Accra and Lom6 accords,
the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone contracted away their
population's basic human rights and governance entitlements guaranteed
in international law. In addition, the UN, the AU, and ECOWAS sanc-
tioned and thereby legitimized these otherwise unlawful peace
agreements for the apparent public good, in breach of the spirit and sub-
stance of their own constitutive agreements and universal international
law. The UN, however, is the most liable of the three institutions, given
401. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
402. Barnes, supra note 359.
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its supreme political standing and uncontestable legal obligation to main-
tain international peace and security, and given its bogus rhetoric about
protection and promoting human rights and democracy in Africa.
While the UN has a poor record of keeping the peace in Africa (con-
sider Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur, Sudan from 2003-present), it has
occasionally authorized and/or taken enforcement measures in Africa
under its Chapter VII powers to curb massive human rights violations
and threats to democratically-elected governments. 3 In the wake of the
1997 coup d'etat in Sierra Leone, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
stated that the "success of Africa's third wave depends equally on respect
for fundamental human rights" and democratic rule. ' He has made the
case that
Africa can no longer tolerate, and accept as faits accomplis,
coups against elected government, and the illegal seizure of
power by military cliques, who sometimes act for sectional in-
terests, sometimes simply for their own. . . . Accordingly, let us
dedicate ourselves to a new doctrine for African politics; Where
democracy has been usurped, let us do whatever is in our power
to restore it to its rightful owners, the people.4 °5
Annan's comments arguably marked the beginning of a pendulum
shift away from the UN's practice of silence and inaction on issues it
traditionally considered internal or within the exclusive jurisdiction of
states-and to a new doctrine that overrides state sovereignty to protect
human rights and democracy.4 For example, Annan publicly expressed
concern over the extraconstitutional transfer of power in Togo in 2005,
commenting that it had "not been done in full respect of the provisions
of the Constitution."' 7 He has also appealed to the international commu-
403. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Se-
curity Council on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa, para. 35-45, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998); See
generally Levitt, The African Union Peace and Security Council, United Nations Security
Council and the Use of Force: The Case of Darfur Sudan, supra note 303; Jeremy I. Levitt,
Humanitarian Intervention in Africa: Africa's Pathbreaking Model, 7 GLOBAL DIALOGUE,
Winter/Spring 2005; Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, supra note
303; Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, supra note 303.
404. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Calls for Efforts to Unleash
African "Third Wave" Based on Democracy, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development,
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6245/Rev.1 AFR/9/Rev.1 (June 2, 2002).
405. Id.
406. See generally Reisman, supra note 373; THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001).
407. Annan Calls on Togolese to Respect Own Constitution in Appointing Presidential
Successor, UN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
printnewsAr.asp?nid=13261 (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
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nity to "ostracize and isolate putschists" and stray away from passive
verbal condemnations of illegal seizures of power. 4 8 Annan has gone as
far as to encourage ECOWAS to "deal" with duly elected governments
that, again, "violate constitutional norms and flout basic principles of
good governance," an attitude that represents a serious departure from
the long-standing tradition of UN nonintervention in the internal affairs
of states--even when mass violations of human rights occur.4°9 Whether
or not Annan's statements and declaration are mere rhetoric or have real
import remains to be seen.
A recent Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council
on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict
societies considered peace, justice, democracy, and respect for the rights
of victims and the accused as "mutually reinforcing imperatives.'" 0 Nev-
ertheless, under Annan's leadership the UN has morally sanctioned
several illegal transfers of power that violated national and international
law, including those in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Ironically, while con-
centrating its efforts on the immediacy of the security needs of at-risk
populations in places such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN admits to
generally failing to "address the grave injustices of war [and] the root
causes of conflict,'"' thereby undermining justice and the rule 
of law. 12
In the report, the UN stated that the "rule of law" is
a concept at the very heart of the Organization's mission. It refers
to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are account-
able to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with interna-
tional human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well,
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of
408. Id.
409. The Secretary-General, Message to the Summit of Heads of State and Government
of the Economic Community of West African States, delivered by Mr. Ahmedou Ould-
Abdallah, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of UN Office for West
Africa, Accra, Ghana (Dec. 19, 2003).
410. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Se-
curity Council on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict
Societies, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
411. See id. 4.
412. Id. 1 6. The UN defines "justice" as an "ideal of accountability and fairness in the
protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Justice
implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and for the well-being
of society at large. It is a concept rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, while its
administration usually implies formal judicial mechanisms, traditional dispute resolution
mechanisms are equally relevant. The international community has worked to articulate col-
lectively the substantive and procedural requirements for the administration of justice for more
than half a century." Id.
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law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in
the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and
procedural and legal transparency. 3
The gap between UN rhetoric and action, particularly as it relates to
UN peacemaking prescriptions in Africa, presents a strange contradic-
tion. This rift does not simply present itself in the context of UN
speechifying and inaction but also in the realm of UN action and coun-
teraction.
The Credentials Committee of the UN, for example, refused to
credit, recognize, and grant UN General Assembly representation to the
so-called governments of Charles Taylor in Liberia (until he won elec-
tions in 1997) and Johnny Paul Koromo in Sierra Leone in 1997 (after he
overthrew Kabbah's democratically elected regime), despite the fact that
Taylor and Koroma were in effective control of their states."' The Cre-
dentials Committee's decision not to credit insurrectionists in Liberia
and Sierra Leone seems to have rested primarily "upon whether the ap-
plicant government was democratic and whether the applicant
government originally came to power by overthrowing a democratic
government."4 5 Hence, while one body within the UN system took bold
stances vis-A-vis the normative value of what Thomas Franck has re-
ferred to as the "democratic entitlement,'116 other UN institutions, such
as the Office of the Secretary-General and the UN Security Council,
sanctioned the Accra and Lom6 accords-which shared power with
many of the same actors that headed the de facto governments the Cre-
dentials Committee had originally refused to accredit. 7 In yet another
turnaround, the UN later formally backed the creation of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, which was designed to "prosecute persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
413. Id.
414. Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the
United Nations Promote Democracy Through Its Accreditation Process, and Should It?, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 725, 725, 726, 748 (2000). In fact, the Credentials Committee ac-
credited representatives of Samuel Doe's government even though it lost power and Doe was
killed in 1990, and it also "accredited the delegation of the deposed, democratically-elected
government of President Kabbah of Sierra Leone." Id. at 747.
415. Id. at 725, 726. According to Griffin, the central consequence of not being accred-
ited is the inability to participate in the business of the General Assembly. Id. at 729.
416. See generally Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. JUR. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
417. As previously mentioned, the UN served as moral guarantor to both the Accra and
Lomd accords and endorsed them through the UN Security Council in, among others, resolu-
tions 1509 and 1260, respectively. These accords empowered senior advisers of Charles Taylor
(who, under the agreement, sought asylum in Nigeria) to maintain power in 2003 and likewise
empowered Foday Sankoh to violently challenge Kabbah's regime in 1999.
[Vol. 27:495
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.''4"" These persons included,
among others, the same individuals whose violent acquisitions of power
were rejected by the Credentials Committee (e.g., Taylor in Liberia in
1997 and Koroma and Sankoh in Sierra Leone in 1997) and later sanc-
tioned by, for example, the Lom6 Agreement in 1999 (e.g., Sankoh in
Sierra Leone).
If the UN served as an example to states and other international in-
stitutions by consistently complying with its own rules and doctrine,
power-sharing would not pose such a dilemma for states immersed in
conflict. If it honored its responsibility to maintain international peace
and security in Africa,419 democratically constituted governments would
not be forced to make peace and share power with warlords and rebels.
In this context, UN inaction has directly and significantly contributed to
Africa's culture of impunity, illegal peace, and, consequently, its instabil-
ity.
The concluding section discusses the major findings of this Article
and offers a conceptual way forward and a minimum set of standards
that power-sharing arrangements must meet to qualify as lawful.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article exposes inherent legal and policy-related flaws in peace
prescriptions that force democratically constituted regimes to share
power with warlords and rebels. It reveals that coerced peace agreements
that mandate political power-sharing, such as the Accra and Lomd ac-
cords, blatantly violate domestic, subregional, regional, and international
rules, doctrines, and practices. The Accra and Lom6 agreements each
violated at least 30 provisions in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean consti-
tutions. The accords also offended numerous and prevailing human
rights and democracy and governance-related treaty law and norms, as
well as regional and international customary law designed to protect
human rights and democracy, by force if necessary, and ensure account-
ability for atrocious crimes.420 The Accra and Lom6 agreements offered
no legal basis or authority to legitimize their extralegality, let alone their
418. Agreement Between the United Nations and Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, Appen-
dix 11, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html.
419. S.C. Res. 1631, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1631 (Oct. 17, 2005).
420. As previously noted, because this Article is limited to an examination of the legality
of power-sharing under human rights law and democracy norms, additional research is needed
to determine the extent to which international humanitarian law and refugee law may inform
the study of the legality of power-sharing.
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power-sharing provisions. It follows that they are derived from a lawless
black hole of unsubstantiated authority in which illegally sharing power
for the perceived good of peace is acceptable despite the existence of
well-established governing rules to the contrary.
Under the Accra and Lom6 agreements, power-sharing was nothing
more than a euphemism for "guns for jobs," despite the fact that, again,
there were and are rules that govern peace agreements in internal con-
flicts-rules that unequivocally prohibit sharing power extra-
constitutionally, let alone with warlords and rebels responsible for com-
mitting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities.
Governments and international institutions are obligated to abide by their
own rules and those regional and international rules to which they sub-
scribe-rules that in turn play regulatory and determinative roles in
influencing the character of organizational and state behavior generally.
Accordingly, since the Accra and Lom6 agreements did not acknowledge
the supremacy of domestic and international rules, they did not provide
war victims, among others, any legal venues or national organs in which
they could pursue criminal and civil complaints arising from the Libe-
rian and Sierra Leonean civil wars and seek effective remedies. As
previously noted, the accords also prohibited Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans from enjoying their right to self-determination (i.e., their right
to choose their own forms of government and leaders through democ-
ratic processes rather than through forced power-sharing). Thus, the
agreements violated the "democratic entitlement," which, as Franck has
explained, is the principle under which governments derive their author-
ity and legitimacy from the consent of the governed; the agreements
further contravened the requirement of democracy that has entered inter-
national law, particularly in Africa, through new global standards
validating governments in the view of the international community.
42 1
When democratically constituted governments are forced to share
power illegally, the resulting agreement has two fundamental and iniqui-
tous consequences: it rewards and pacifies warlords and rebels with
political and economic power or prizes, and it creates some semblance of
peace and thus the false perception that there is little need for substantial
assistance from the international community, particularly the UN.
Hence, the only prizewinners of power-sharing are rebels, political elites,
and the international donor community-the former two groups reap the
rewards of de jure authority and power and the latter is spared from mak-
ing the vast expenditures needed to manage Africa's civil conflicts.
International decisionmakers typically select the most cost-effective
route to resolving conflict from their menu of options, and subregional,
421. Franck, supra note 416, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
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regional, and international organizations, especially the UN, too often
sanction quick fix solutions (i.e., power-sharing), despite the fact that
governing rules, state practice, and empirical data demonstrate that
"power-sharing governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil
war." 2 Stated differently, governments are more apt to degenerate into
warring factions when they are constituted unlawfully.
This Article argues that in order to make "legal peace," decision-
makers should adhere to several principles when negotiating peace
arrangements:
• Take stock of all governing rules before beginning peace ne-
gotiations.
• Allow governing rules to shape and influence the character of
negotiations (i.e., what is legally permissible and what is not).
• Work within, not outside, the existing legal framework, using
governing rules as the minimum standard of acceptability.
• Be unswerving in mediatory approaches by sending consis-
tent messages to the relevant parties.
* Seek timely international support for rule-based approaches
using affirmative inducements such as recognition, aid, trade,
and support in reforming the security sector.4 3
* Ensure peacemakers remain in control of negotiations and the
implementation processes and do not allow warlords to retain
vetoes and rewards.
* Realize that the protection of human rights and democracy is
integral and not contrary to security and remember that inter-
national law prevails over domestic peace accords in any
conflict of law. As Crocker and Hampson have noted, "[t]he
lesson, then, is to not permit military policies to become un-
hinged or detached from the broader [legal and] political
purposes they are intended to serve. Also, timidity in the face
of armed militias is not effective-especially when the clock
is working in their favor.'424 It is the concern over security and
a resumption of war that provides the best rationale not to
share power with warlords and rebels who will undoubtedly
inject criminal and predatory behavior into the political cul-
ture.
422. Licklider, supra note 42, at 681.
423. Wippman, supra note 41, at 218.
424. Crocker & Hampson, supra note 18, at 69.
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" International donors and multilateral organizations taking part
in negotiation processes need to serve as legal guarantors-as
opposed to moral guarantors-in order to ensure adherence to
governing rules and protect fundamental legal rights. States
and multilateral institutions that sanction peace deals have a
positive duty to protect human rights and democracy and not
subvert them by sanctioning unlawful arrangements.
" Utilize international precedent or doctrine from international
bodies, such as the prodemocracy determinations of the UN
Credentials Committee, to influence negotiation processes
and political outcomes.
The cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone show that power-sharing at
the macro level benefits political elites, whether warlords or government
officials, by reinforcing Africa's patrimonial political culture of govern-
ance "from above" while leaving low-level combatants and traditional
structures of authority-under which the majority of Africans live-at
the periphery. This occurs largely because peace agreements that include
power-sharing components are often made in haste, forged out of politi-
cal necessity and expediency, and because when a warlord "perceives
greater advantages for himself or his group from aggression, he is likely
to accept a second-preference solution [to victory] such as power shar-
ing. '425 In this context, for political elites, sharing power is a win-win
alternative to unfettered war. Whether warlord or democrat, these elites
choose political rewards as opposed to a continuance of war and its harsh
impacts on civil society; death and/or defeat on the battlefield; or com-
plete political and economic disenfranchisement at the hands of the
prizewinner. The most significant factors driving the need to share power
in the Accra and Lom6 accords were not, as Sisk has noted, an apprecia-• 426
tion of a shared destiny or pragmatism but the prospects of a worse
outcome-that is, the needs of Taylor and his cohorts to remain un-
scathed, alive, and wealthy and the needs of Kabbah and his followers to
427remain in political power.
Under international law, states are responsible for resolving internal
disorder, curtailing the repressive conduct of their officials, and facilitat-
ing post-conflict justice; hence, on one hand, it may be immoral and
unlawful for a government to allow deadly conflict, with its dispropor-
tionate effect on civilians, to continue until reaching a "legal peace." On
the other hand, it may be immoral, irresponsible, and unlawful to offer
425. Sisk, supra note 7, at 78.
426. Id.
427. Charles Taylor resigned as president and fled to asylum in Nigeria-taking with
him substantial wealth-to avoid being overthrown and likely killed by rebels.
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amnesty and share power for the perceived collective good if such action
requires placing the political and economic prerogatives of warlords and
rebels above the fundamental human rights and democracy entitlements
of war victims. The true-to-life tension between relieving the conditions
that produce human suffering and illegally sharing power with those who
are fundamentally responsible for creating instability and butchering
their populations would not exist if the UN honored its Charter-based
responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
428
The international community should no longer accept power-sharing
as the natural cost of the transition from civil war to nascent democracy.
Until decisionmakers stop viewing peace negotiations and processes
through solely political-rather than legal-lenses, the outcomes of such
negotiations will likely be unlawful and arguably politically infeasible.
When parties give law and politics equal consideration in peace negotia-
tions, peace becomes more durable because the rule of law remains
unscathed by political prerogatives. This does not mean the law alone
offers a more workable model for resolving protracted conflict than
purely political approaches, but it does mean viable models of conflict
resolution must seek to comply with governing domestic, regional, and
international rules.4 9 As decisionmakers in Liberia and Sierra Leone
have demonstrated, "[w]ithout institutions to enforce the rule of law, po-
litical actors will ignore the public interest in favor of their private goals"
of maintaining power, privilege, and wealth through power-sharing, de-
spite the broader societal consequences.430 While this Article clearly
shows there are domestic, subregional, regional, and international rules
that govern power-sharing in internal conflicts and proffers a checklist
for decisionmakers and peace guarantors, additional research must be
conducted that explores under what circumstances, if at all, embattled
regimes can make "legal peace" that allows for power-sharing and serves
the public good.
In the absence of UN Security Council action, governments must
fashion peace in accordance with governing rules. They must, depending
428. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
429. One analyst notes that power-sharing in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Somalia
has rendered few positive results, arguing that "while power sharing or inclusion has been
cited as a necessary direction which African leaders should follow, it remains relatively un-
proven as a means of conflict resolution. There are, in fact, relatively few examples of
successful, formalised power-sharing in Africa which warrant its advocacy." Ian S. Spears,
Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power, 21
THIRD WORLD Q. 105, 106 (2000).
430. Barnes, supra 359, at 92.
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on the character of their political system, 3' seek to obtain prior approval
from their legislatures before entering into any peace deals that abrogate
national and international rules and curtail fundamental freedoms. Legis-
lative approval or sanctioning is not difficult to acquire in most African
states, particularly those emerging from conflict, given Africa's majori-
tarian and patrimonial political (spoils) systems that more often than not
rubber-stamp executive prerogatives. In the event legislative sanction is
not possible, governments should employ constitutionally-based emer-
gency powers to take whatever lawful actions are necessary to make
peace without infringing national and international rules. A state's con-
stitutional framework and prevailing regional and international law
should serve as guideposts and allow the negotiation and implementation
of peace deals to unfold in a staged process based on the rule of law. At
the very least, if governments are unable or unwilling to honor governing
rules, any of their actions that exceed their constitutive powers must,
under international law, be supported by mass consensus-through, for
example, national referendums.
When neither legislative approval nor national consensus-building is
possible, governments forced to negotiate extralegal peace agreements
should seek to minimize the impact of any constitutionally impermissi-
ble action by relying extensively on executive powers. While under the
Liberian and Sierra Leonean constitutions emergency powers do not in-
clude the power to suspend, modify, or abrogate constitutions, they do
grant vast authority to make or suspend, modify, or abrogate any other
laws. Again, embattled governments should not violate organic constitu-
tional law or ignore their international obligations to their citizens in a
rush to peace but should work within existing legal frameworks for the
collective good of long-term peace and the creation of rule-based socie-
ties.
Part of the rationale for this approach lies in the fact that extralegal
peace agreements with amnesty and power-sharing components typically
receive little support from the public and often fail to secure lasting
peace. Seven years after the adoption of the Lom6 Agreement, the politi-
cal situation in Sierra Leone remains extremely fragile, and socio-
political tensions and insecurity in Liberia have made it a powder keg. A
study by the Monrovia-based Liberian Transitional Justice Working
Group on attitudes about criminal justice for past atrocities found that 59
percent of Liberians "believe that faction leaders and commanders al-
431. Most African states have parliamentary-based common law systems, supposedly
with checks-and-balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment.
432. The ex post facto adoption of the Lom6 Peace Agreement (Ratification) Act by the
defunct Sierra Leone Legislature is a case in point.
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leged to have ordered or committed widespread human rights abuses
should be prosecuted in formal legal proceedings. 4 3  The failure to
prosecute these individuals, combined with forced power-sharing, has
sown seeds of discontent into Liberia's new sociopolitical order. 4 War-
lords and rebels must understand that they will be held criminally and/or
civilly accountable or will otherwise be sanctioned for committing
atrocities while waging unjust and brutal wars to unseat democratically
constituted regimes. When the political dynamics within a state will not
permit holdingperpetrators of atrocities criminally accountable, deci-
sionmakers should pursue during peace negotiations other noncriminal
sanctions for the most serious abusers, including "removal from office,
demotion, naming, or some other public recognition that these persons
have not achieved impunity for their actions.""43 It follows, at a mini-
mum, that governments should not permit these abusers to hold public
office or share power.
Power-sharing in Africa, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone,
has led to a certain global apathy toward the continent-which explains
why evil men have been all too successful in using guns to acquire jobs.
If African states and their regional and global institutions and patrons
want to reverse the violent conflict, culture of impunity, and blatant dis-
regard for human rights law and democracy norms that have caused
massive conflicts, precipitated state collapse, and forced weak govern-
ments to share power, steadfast and resilient adherence to the rule of law
in peace negotiations is vital. Tyrants must no longer be rewarded for
terrorizing the majority.
433. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LIBERIA AT A CROSSROADS: HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES
FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 18 (2005) (citing ROSNER RESEARCH INC., NATIONAL CONSEN-
SUS ON DEALING WITH WAR CRIMES REPORT 11 (2004)).
434. It is not simply the failure to prosecute that is problematic, but also the failure to
investigate serious violations of physical integrity, particularly torture, extrajudicial killings,
and forced disappearances, as required in the ICCPR, the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human
Rights.
435. Ratner, supra note 16, at 746-47.
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